Equity Up in Smoke: Civil RICO, Disgorgement, and United States v. Philip Morris by McCall, Christopher L.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 74 Issue 4 Article 31 
2006 
Equity Up in Smoke: Civil RICO, Disgorgement, and United States v. 
Philip Morris 
Christopher L. McCall 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christopher L. McCall, Equity Up in Smoke: Civil RICO, Disgorgement, and United States v. Philip Morris, 74 
Fordham L. Rev. 2461 (2006). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol74/iss4/31 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Equity Up in Smoke: Civil RICO, Disgorgement, and United States v. Philip Morris 
Cover Page Footnote 
J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank my friends and family for 
their support. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol74/iss4/31 
COMMENT
EQUITY UP IN SMOKE: CIVIL RICO,
DISGORGEMENT, AND UNITED STATES V. PHILIP
MORRIS
Christopher L. McCall*
INTRODUCTION
On September 22, 1999, the United States Government filed an
unprecedented lawsuit against the world's largest tobacco companies I in the
District Court for the District of Columbia.2 "The tobacco companies,"
then-President Bill Clinton said at a press conference announcing the suit,
"should answer to the taxpayers for their actions." 3  At the same press
conference, then-Attorney General Janet Reno said that the tobacco
companies "have waged an intentional, coordinated campaign of fraud and
deceit.., designed to preserve their enormous profits whatever the cost in
human lives, human suffering and medical resources. The consequences
have been staggering." 4
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank my
friends and family for their support.
1. The Government's complaint named as defendants tobacco manufacturers Philip
Morris, Inc., Philip Morris Companies, Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corporation, American Tobacco Company, Lorillard Tobacco
Company, British-American Tobacco Co., Ltd., British American Tobacco (Investments),
Ltd., and the Liggett Group, Inc. Two industry trade groups, the Council for Tobacco
Research-U.S.A., Inc., and the Tobacco Institute, were also named.
2. See Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, United States v.
Philip Morris, Inc., No. 99-CV-02496 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 1999). The Complaint was
subsequently amended. See First Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief, United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 99-CV-02496 (D.D.C. Feb. 28,
2001) [hereinafter First Amended Complaint].
3. Marc Lacey, Tobacco Industry Accused of Fraud in Lawsuit by US., N.Y. Times,
Sept. 23, 1999, at Al.
4. Id. Interestingly, then-Texas Governor and Republican presidential candidate
George W. Bush criticized the lawsuit, saying through a spokesperson that he "hoped the era
of big government will not be replaced by the era of big lawsuits." Id When Governor Bush
became President in January 2001 and decided to proceed with the case, anti-smoking
groups-which pointed out that the tobacco industry had donated some $8 million in the
2000 election, more than eighty percent of it to Republican candidates-were concerned that
the new administration would fail to vigorously support the case, as President Bill Clinton
had. See David Johnston, In Shift, US. Opens Effort to Settle Tobacco Lawsuit, N.Y. Times,
June 20, 2001, at Al. Some of these concerns appear well-founded. In April 2001, the
Justice Department's Tobacco Litigation Team sent a memorandum to then-Attorney
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The Government's suit, United States v. Philip Morris, contained four
counts. The first two counts sought to recover billions of dollars in costs
incurred by the Government in providing health care for Medicare patients,
military veterans, and federal employees suffering from smoking-related
illnesses. 5  The remaining-and far more controversial-counts were
brought under § 1964 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), 6 RICO's civil provision.7 The Government
alleged that the tobacco companies constituted a "racketeering enterprise"
under RICO and sought to disgorge approximately $280 billion from the
tobacco companies for various RICO violations since 1970, the year the
statute was enacted.8
On December 27, 1999, the tobacco companies moved to dismiss the
complaint, 9 arguing, inter alia, that disgorgement is not, as a matter of law,
a remedy available under § 1964(a) of RICO, which grants district courts
jurisdiction to "prevent and restrain violations of [RICO] by issuing
appropriate orders, including, but not limited to" orders of divestment,
injunction, and dissolution.' 0  The tobacco companies argued that
disgorgement, an "inherently backward-looking" remedy, could not be
imposed under § 1964(a), which only permits forward-looking remedies,
"in keeping with the statute's stated purpose-'to prevent and restrain'
future violations.""l l
The district court granted the tobacco companies' motion to dismiss on
two of the Government's counts but permitted the two RICO counts to
proceed, holding that disgorgement was indeed an available remedy under
RICO. 12 In holding that disgorgement was, as a matter of law, available
under § 1964(a), the district court relied on a decision of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, which at the time was the only appellate
court to have addressed the issue. In United States v. Carson,13 the Second
General John Ashcroft to inform him that, of the $57 million the division estimated it would
need to proceed with the case that year, the Bush Administration had only budgeted $1.8
million for it. See Christopher Marquis, Warning on U.S. Tobacco Suit, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25,
2001, at A16.
5. See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
7. See infra notes 220-25 and accompanying text. The Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") counts were considered highly controversial because
the Government's suit marked the first time that RICO had been used against an entire
American industry. See Barry Meier, Two Strategies at Work and Stiff Challenges Ahead in
Federal Lawsuit, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1999, at A22. The fact that two of the defendants in
the Government's case-Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds-appeared on the Fortune 500 list
at eight and eighty-nine, respectively, see Fortune 500 Largest U.S. Corporations, Fortune,
Apr. 26, 1999, at F-i, at the time the lawsuit was filed only fueled the controversy.
8. See infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
9. See Certain Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss,
United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 99-CV-02496)
[hereinafter Motion to Dismiss].
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a).
11. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 50 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a)).
12. See Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131; infra Part II.C.2.
13. See United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173 (2d Cir. 1995); infra Part II.A.
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Circuit held that disgorgement was an available remedy under § 1964(a),
but only under very limited circumstances. Specifically, Carson held that
disgorgement would only be an appropriate means of preventing and
restraining future RICO violations where the money to be disgorged was
presently being used or was capable of being used to fund such violations.
Because the district court in Philip Morris read Carson to require a factual
finding before disgorgement could be imposed-namely, that the tobacco
companies were presently committing or were capable of committing future
RICO violations-it rejected the tobacco companies' motion to dismiss as
premature. 14
On August 1, 2003, the tobacco companies filed a motion for summary
judgment to dismiss the Government's disgorgement claim, recapitulating
many of the arguments from their motion to dismiss. 15 The district court
denied the motion, holding that disgorgement could be imposed, consistent
with a district court's inherent equitable powers, upon a factual finding of a
likelihood of future violations. 16 Because the likelihood of future violations
was a disputed question of fact, the district court denied the tobacco
companies' motion for summary judgment. In its opinion, the district court
also addressed the Second Circuit's holding in Carson and the holding of
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Richard v. Hoechst Celanese
Chemical Group,17 in which the Fifth Circuit adopted Carson. The district
court rejected the restriction Carson and Richard sought to place on a
district court's ability to impose whatever equitable remedies it deemed
appropriate under § 1964(a), holding that the restriction was inconsistent
with the text of § 1964(a) as well as RICO's legislative purpose.
The tobacco companies appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia. On February 4, 2005, the D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that,
contrary to the district court's conclusion that § 1964(a) granted district
courts full equitable jurisdiction, § 1964(a) only granted district courts
authority to impose forward-looking remedies, and disgorgement was not
such a remedy.' 8 The D.C. Circuit also addressed, and explicitly rejected,
both Carson and Richard, holding that disgorgement was categorically
unavailable under § 1964(a).19 The Government filed a petition for
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on
October 17, 2005.20
14. See infra Part Ii.C.2.
15. See Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Dismissing the Government's Disgorgement Claim, United States v. Philip Morris USA,
Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 99-CV-02496) [hereinafter Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment].
16. See Philip Morris USA, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 72; infra Part II.C.3.
17. See Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Group, 355 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2003); infra
Part II.B.
18. See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 478 (2005); infra Part II.D.1.
19. See infra Part II.D.2.
20. See Philip Morris USA, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 478. At the time of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia's decision, the case was being tried by Distri-.. Court
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This Comment addresses the availability of disgorgement as a remedy
under § 1964(a) of the RICO statute. More specifically, this Comment
addresses whether § 1964(a) grants district courts the full range of equitable
jurisdiction to impose whatever remedies they deem appropriate-
including, but not limited to, the equitable remedy of disgorgement-or
whether the language in § 1964(a) authorizing district courts to issue
appropriate orders to "prevent and restrain" future RICO violations
circumscribes their jurisdiction.
In Part I, this Comment examines the RICO statute itself, focusing on its
civil provision and the grant of equitable jurisdiction in § 1964(a). Next
this Comment discusses the nature of equitable jurisdiction generally and
the significance of its roots in British common law. Then this Comment
discusses three specific cases in which the United States Supreme Court has
analyzed grants of equitable jurisdiction similar to the one at issue in §
1964(a).
In Part II, this Comment describes and analyzes the three positions that
have been staked out vis-A-vis the availability of disgorgement as a remedy
under § 1964(a). First, this Comment analyzes the decisions of the Second
and Fifth Circuits in Carson and Richard, respectively, in which the courts
held that, although § 1964(a) does not provide a general grant of equitable
jurisdiction, disgorgement could, under limited circumstances, be
considered a means of preventing and restraining future RICO violations
and therefore permissible under § 1964(a). Second, this Comment analyzes
the decision of the District Court for the District of Columbia in Philip
Morris, in which the district court held that § 1964(a) does provide a
general grant of equitable jurisdiction and that disgorgement could be
imposed consistent with a district court's equitable authority. Third, this
Comment analyzes the decision of the D.C. Circuit in Philip Morris, in
which the D.C. Circuit held that § 1964(a) circumscribes a district court's
equitable jurisdiction and further held that disgorgement is categorically
unavailable under § 1964(a), thereby reversing the district court and
explicitly rejecting Carson and Richard.
In Part III, this Comment argues in favor of the position taken by the
district court in Philip Morris and the dissenting opinion in the D.C.
Circuit's Philip Morris decision. Specifically, this Comment argues that §
1964(a) does indeed represent a general grant of equitable jurisdiction.
Consistent with that jurisdiction, a district court has the authority to impose
whatever equitable remedies it deems appropriate, including disgorgement,
upon a finding of a reasonable likelihood of future RICO violations.
Because the availability of disgorgement is dependent on a factual
finding-namely, the likelihood of future violations-this Comment argues
Judge Gladys Kessler without a jury. The trial lasted nine months, ending in June 2005. See
Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup: Justices Reject Appeal in Tobacco Case, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 18, 2005, at A18; Michael Janofsky & David Johnson, Limit for Award in
Tobacco Case Sets Off Protest, N.Y. Times, June 9, 2005, at Al. As of this writing, Judge
Kessler has yet to issue a decision.
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that its availability is ultimately a question of fact to be determined by a
jury.
While this issue may seem rather esoteric, it is far from an academic
question. As this Comment discusses, the extent of the authority vested in a
district court by the statutory grant of jurisdiction in § 1964(a) proved to be
a critical issue in the Government's $280 billion suit against the tobacco
companies. This Comment, moreover, should be read in the context of the
broader debate between those who advocate an approach to statutory
interpretation that, in the words of one commentator, "tend[s] to prefer
mechanical, rules-based methods of interpretation that, at least ostensibly,
minimize the role of judicial choice" and those who advocate a standards-
based approach to statutory interpretation that "calls upon courts to make
intelligent choices and, on appropriate occasions, to deviate from the most
straightforward reading of statutory text. '21
I. SECTION 1964(A) AND EQUITABLE GRANTS OF JURISDICTION
This part begins with a brief examination of the RICO statute and its
legislative history,22 with a special emphasis on the statute's civil provision.
Next, this part discusses the distinction between law and equity at common
law in order to understand the broad range of powers available to a court
exercising equitable jurisdiction. Finally, this part looks at three Supreme
21. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory
Interpretation, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 339, 339 (2005).
22. This Comment proceeds from the assumption that consideration of legislative history
and purpose is an appropriate method of statutory interpretation. This assumption is,
admittedly, highly debatable, but addressing it adequately is far beyond the scope of this
Comment. For arguments against consideration of legislative history and purpose, see Frank
H. Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the Lens of Public Choice, 12
Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 284, 284 (1992) (arguing that "the concept of 'an' intent for a person is
fictive and for an institution hilarious. A hunt for this snipe liberates the interpreter, who can
attribute to the drafters whatever 'intent' serves purposes derived by other means"); John F.
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419, 450 (2005) (arguing against
consideration of legislative intent because "[t]he legislative process is untidy and opaque; it
gives those with intense and even outlying preferences numerous opportunities to slow or
stop legislation and to insist upon compromise as the price of assent," thereby making it
impossible to discern the true intent of any given piece of legislation); Antonin Scalia,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 517
(arguing that "the quest for the 'genuine' legislative intent is probably a wild-goose chase").
For arguments taking the opposing point of view, see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845, 847 (1992) (then-First
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge and current Supreme Court Justice defending the
consideration of legislative purpose and arguing that "any significant change in the extent to
which courts look to legislative history would likely prove harmful"); Jonathan R. Siegel,
The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1457,
1510-28 (2000) (arguing that courts should consider certain legislative materials in
attempting to discern legislative purpose); Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public
Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 Geo. L.J. 427,
429 (2005) (arguing that "even when there is no dispute about meaning, intent lurks in the
background as a crucial element of our understanding").
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Court cases interpreting grants of jurisdiction similar to the one in §
1964(a).
A. RICO
RICO was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970,23 a broad-based congressional effort to combat organized crime, the
effects of which, according to Congress, "weaken the stability of the
Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing
organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate
and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the
general welfare of the Nation and its citizens." 24 Congress directed that
RICO "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes," 25 a
mandate the Supreme Court has at least acknowledged, 26 if not always
applied.27 In order to provide "new weapons of unprecedented scope for an
assault upon organized crime and its economic roots," 28 RICO contains
23. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18 U.S.C.).
24. Id (Statement of Findings and Purpose). After an extensive review of RICO's
legislative history, Professor G. Robert Blakey, one of RICO's principal drafters, concluded
that the following points were established "beyond serious question":
(1) Congress fully intended, after specific debate, to have RICO apply beyond
any limiting concept like "organized crime" or "racketeering";
(2) Congress deliberately redrafted RICO outside of the antitrust statutes, so
that it would not be limited by antitrust concepts like "competitive,"
"commercial," or "direct or indirect" injury;
(3) Both immediate victims of racketeering activity and competing
organizations were contemplated as civil plaintiffs for injunction, damage, and
other relief;
(4) Over specific objections raising issues of federal-state relations and crowded
court dockets, Congress deliberately extended RICO to the general field of
commercial and other fraud; and
(5) Congress was well aware that it was creating important new federal criminal
and civil remedies in a field traditionally occupied by common law fraud.
G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg,
58 Notre Dame L. Rev.'237, 280 (1982). For additional discussion of RICO's evolution in
Congress and in the courts, see Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal,
Parts I & I1, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 661, 664-713 (1987).
25. 84 Stat. at 947. But see Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal
Analysis, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 581, 582 (1990) (including the liberal construction rule as
a "canard" of legal analysis and observing that "the effort, with respect to any statute, should
be neither liberally to expand nor strictly to constrict its meaning, but rather to get the
meaning precisely right").
26. "RICO is to be read broadly. This is the lesson not only of Congress'[s] self-
consciously expansive language and overall approach.., but also of its express admonition
that RICO is to 'be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."' Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985) (quoting Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1961 (2000))).
27. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183 (1993) (holding that the liberal
construction mandate "seeks to ensure that Congress'[s] intent is not frustrated by an overly
narrow reading of the statute, but it is not an invitation to apply RICO to new purposes that
Congress never intended").
28. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983).
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both criminal29 and civil 30 provisions to impose a range of penalties when a
defendant violates the statute.
1. A RICO Violation
RICO prohibits any person3 l from: (1) investing income derived from a
pattern of racketeering activity32 in an enterprise engaged in interstate or
foreign commerce; 33 (2) acquiring an interest in any enterprise engaged in
interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity; 34 (3)
participating in the affairs of an enterprise that affects interstate commerce
through a pattern of racketeering activity;35 or (4) conspiring to participate
in any of the foregoing. 36 The Supreme Court has held that RICO applies
not only to organized crime syndicates but also to legitimate businesses37
and to organizations operating without a profit motive.38 Indeed, courts
have liberally construed the type of organization that can constitute an
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963.
30. See id. § 1964.
31. RICO defines a person as "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property." Id. § 1961(3). Courts have consistently interpreted "person"
broadly under the RICO statute. See, e.g., Jund v. Town of Hempstead, 941 F.2d 1271, 1282
(2d Cir. 1991) (holding that an unincorporated political association constitutes a "person"
under RICO); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding that a public utility constitutes a "person" under RICO). But see Donahue v.
FBI, 204 F. Supp. 2d 169, 173-74 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation does not constitute a "person" under RICO).
32. A pattern of racketeering activity "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity,
one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter [1970] and the last of which
occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a
prior act of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). The list of offenses constituting
"racketeering activity" can be found at id. § 1961(1).
33. Id § 1962(a).
34. Id. § 1962(b).
35. Id. § 1962(c).
36. Id. § 1962(d).
37. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (holding that
legitimate businesses "enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor
immunity from its consequences").
38. See Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 261 (1994) (permitting a
RICO action to proceed against an anti-abortion group even though the group did not operate
for profit); United States v. Muyet, 994 F. Supp. 501, 511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that
RICO does not require the Government to prove a drug ring operated for profit). After the
Supreme Court remanded Scheidler to the Seventh Circuit and that court's decision was
appealed, the Supreme Court heard the case again in 2003 to resolve a circuit split over the
availability of injunctive relief under RICO. See Daniel Z. Herbst, Comment, Injunctive
Relief and Civil RICO: After Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., RICO's
Scope and Remedies Require Reevaluation, 53 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1125, 1146-47 (2004)
(discussing the case, referred to as "Scheidler I"). On November 30, 2005, the Supreme
Court, for the third time, heard arguments in the case. See Linda Greenhouse, For New
Court, Abortion Case Takes Old Path, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 2005, at Al (discussing the
Scheidler case and predicting, based on her impression from the oral argument, that the
Court would again reverse the Seventh Circuit).
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"enterprise" under RICO-from a corporation 39 to a labor union4° to other
types of organizations. 41
To violate RICO, a defendant must have engaged in at least two predicate
acts constituting a "pattern of racketeering activity. '42 The Supreme Court
has held, however, that the two acts cannot constitute a "pattern" under
RICO if they are isolated and unrelated to one another.43 Instead, the acts
must pass the so-called "continuity plus relationship" test-that is, the
"related predicates [must] themselves involve a distinct threat of long-term
racketeering activity, either implicit or explicit."44
2. The Criminal Provisions of RICO
RICO's criminal provision, § 1963, 45 provides that, in addition to any
punishment for the crimes constituting the predicate RICO acts, a defendant
convicted under RICO faces up to twenty years imprisonment, fines, and
possible forfeiture of "any property constituting, or derived from, any
proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from
racketeering activity."'46 More controversial under RICO have been a
provision which allows the Government to seek a restraining order to
prevent a defendant from transferring assets to a third party47 and RICO's
39. See Securitron Magnalock Corp. v. Schnabolk, 65 F.3d 256, 263 (2d Cir. 1995)
(holding that two corporations constituted a RICO "enterprise").
40. See United States v. Cervone, 907 F.2d 332, 336 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a union
and its trust fund constituted a RICO "enterprise"); Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 901
F.2d 404, 434 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a pilot's union constituted a RICO "enterprise").
41. See, e.g., United States v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579, 586-87 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that
a white supremacist organization constituted a RICO "enterprise" because its members
operated with a common purpose and acted in concert to advance that purpose); United
States v. Chance, 306 F.3d 356, 373 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a county sheriff, head of
police vice department, and members of an organized crime syndicate constituted a RICO
"enterprise" because of common purpose); United States v. Phillips, 239 F.3d 829, 844 (7th
Cir. 2001) (holding that a street gang constituted a RICO "enterprise" because it was a well-
established and hierarchical organization). But see Simon v. Value Behavioral Health, Inc.,
208 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that health plans and insurance companies
alleged to have engaged in a scheme to defraud health plan beneficiaries did not constitute a
RICO "enterprise" because there was no common purpose and structure).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2000). A conviction for each of the predicate acts is not
required to initiate a RICO prosecution; in fact at least one court has held that a RICO
prosecution could proceed where one of the predicate acts was a murder for which the
defendant had been acquitted. See United States v. Farmer, 924 F.2d 647, 649 (7th Cir.
1991).
43. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 243 (1989).
44. Id. at 242.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1963. This Comment focuses primarily on RICO's civil provision;
accordingly, the discussion of RICO's criminal provision will be brief. For an extended
analysis of RICO's criminal provision, see Michele Sacks et al., Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations, 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 825, 828-63 (2005).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a).
47. See id. § 1963(d)(1). The section provides in full,
(d)(l) Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining
order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or
2468 [Vol. 74
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forfeiture provisions. 48  Courts have broadly construed the forfeiture
provision to permit the Government to obtain all revenue tainted by a RICO
violation.49
3. The Civil Provision of RICO
Section 1964 is RICO's civil provision. Section 1964(a) grants district
courts equitable jurisdiction 50 over civil RICO actions to
prevent and restrain violations of [RICO] by issuing appropriate orders,
including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any
interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable
restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person,
including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the
same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which
affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or
take any other action to preserve the availability of property described in
subsection (a) for forfeiture under this section-
(A) upon the filing of an indictment or information charging a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter and alleging that the property with respect to which
the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under
this section; or
(B) prior to the filing of such an indictment or information, if, after notice to
persons appearing to have an interest in the property and opportunity for a hearing,
the court determines that-
(i) there is a substantial probability that the United States will prevail on the
issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order will result in the property
being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise made
unavailable for forfeiture; and
(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property through the entry of
the requested order outweighs the hardship on any party against whom the order is
to be entered:
Provided, however, That an order entered pursuant to subparagraph (B) shall be
effective for not more than ninety days, unless extended by the court for good
cause shown or unless an indictment or information described in subparagraph (A)
has been filed.
Id.
48. Section 1963(a) provides that a defendant's property will be forfeited to the United
States Government upon a conviction under RICO. Id. § 1963(a). Section 1963(c) provides
that any property transferred by the defendant to a third party shall also be forfeited to the
United States Government unless the third party can prove he was a bona fide purchaser with
no knowledge of the forfeiture action. Id. § 1963(c).
49. See United States v. Simmons, 154 F.3d 765, 770-71 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that,
under § 1963, the Government is entitled to all "proceeds" of defendant's racketeering,
which refers to gross receipts, not net profits); United States v. McHan, 101 F.3d 1027, 1042
(4th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Hurley, 63 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 1995) (same). But
see United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1370 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that "proceeds"
under § 1963 refers to net profits, not gross receipts).
50. It is undisputed that § 1964(a) is a grant of equitable jurisdiction; the question this
Comment addresses is the extent of this equitable jurisdiction. See United States v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1197-98 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 478 (2005);
United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1181 (2d Cir. 1995).
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reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of
innocent persons. 5 1
The language of § 1964(a) has been interpreted to "grant[] courts broad
discretion and latitude in enjoining violators from activities that might lead
to future violations. '52 Perhaps more significantly, the Supreme Court has
also held that "if Congress'[s] liberal-construction mandate is to be applied
anywhere, it is in § 1964, where RICO's remedial purposes are most
evident. ' 53 While the statute explicitly enumerates three remedies, "'the
list is not exhaustive.' 5 4
Section 1964(b) permits the Attorney General to institute a civil
proceeding. 55 Section 1964(c) provides a private cause of action to "[a]ny
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962" and allows him to recover treble damages and attorney's fees. 56 In
order to bring a suit under § 1964(c), a private plaintiff must show: (1) a
violation of § 1962;57 (2) injury to her business or property; and (3)
causation of the injury by the violation. 58 Significant to the expansion of
civil RICO was the Supreme Court's 1985 holding that a criminal
conviction under RICO is not a prerequisite to a civil action under the
statute. "As defined in the statute," the Supreme Court held in Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., "racketeering activity consists not of acts for which
the defendant has been convicted, but of acts for which he could be."'59 The
Supreme Court's holding in Sedima has been interpreted as part of an effort
by the Supreme Court to reiterate to lower courts that civil RICO, like its
sister criminal provision, should be construed broadly. 60
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a).
52. United States v. Private Sanitation Indus. Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., 995 F.2d
375, 377 (2d Cir. 1993); accord United States v. Sasso, 215 F.3d 283, 289-93 (2d Cir. 2000)
(discussing § 1964(a)'s "expansive language, its legislative history, and the traditional power
of the district courts to fashion equitable remedies"); Blakey, supra note 24, at 331 ("It is
difficult to see how a court could conclude that [§ 1964(a)] does not provide equitable relief
for private parties .... It is not limited on its face or in its legislative history.").
53. Sedima, S.P.L.R. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 491 n.10 (1985).
54. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d at 1218 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Rep. No.
91-617, at 160 (1969)).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b).
56. Id. § 1964(c).
57. The Supreme Court has held that an alleged conspiracy to violate RICO, prohibited
by § 1962(d), cannot provide the basis for the requisite violation in a civil RICO suit. See
Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 507 (2000).
58. See Sacks et al., supra note 45, at 865. The third requirement-causation--has
proven to be the major obstacle to plaintiffs in civil RICO actions. See, e.g., Holmes v. Sec.
Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 271-72 (1992) (holding causation too attenuated to
permit a private plaintiff to recover under § 1964); De Falco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 329
(2d Cir. 2001) (same).
59. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 488 (1985).
60. Sacks et al., supra note 45, at 864; see also Donald R. Lee, Note, The Availability of
Equitable Relief in Civil Causes of Action in RICO, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 945, 966-77
(1984) (reviewing a number of lower court cases in which courts expressed a reluctance to
liberally construe civil RICO actions).
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B. Equity
The Supreme Court has interpreted equitable grants of jurisdiction
similar to the one in § 1964(a)-which authorizes district courts to "prevent
and restrain violations of [RICO] by issuing appropriate orders" 6 t -on a
number of occasions. Three of the Supreme Court's seminal decisions on
this issue are discussed below. But first it will be worthwhile to review the
historical distinction drawn by the common law between cases at law and
cases in equity in order to understand the latitude and discretion vested in a
district court exercising its equitable jurisdiction.
1. The Common Law Distinction Between Law and Equity
The American legal system has its origins in England, where litigation
took place in a bifurcated system of common law, or "law," courts and
Chancery, or "equity," courts. 62 The law courts-which consisted of the
King's Bench, the Common Pleas, and the Exchequer 63-had three
identifying characteristics: the writ system, the jury, and single-issue
pleading.64 Each "represented a means of confining and focusing disputes,
rationalizing and organizing law, and of applying rules in an orderly,
consistent, and predictable manner." 65 It was the writ system, however, that
would provide the sole basis for determining whether a case would be heard
before a law or equity court. 66
Historically, one of the means by which British kings exercised their
authority to uphold justice was by issuing a writ--"royal order(s) which
authori[z]ed a court to hear a case and instructed a sheriff to secure the
attendance of the defendant" 67-which would bring the case directly to the
king's council. 68 Subjects could petition the king's Chancellor, who served
as his secretary, for the issuance of a writ.69 The writ system initially
developed as a means of organizing complaints into categories of
standardized claims-that is, if a complainant presented a set of facts
similar to those alleged by other complainants, the Chancery clerks
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a).
62. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909, 914 (1987).
63. Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 Va.
L. Rev. 753, 756 (1944).
64. Subrin, supra note 62, at 914.
65. Id.
66. Id at 915. The writ system and its influences on American law is the only aspect of
the law courts that will be discussed in this Comment. For a more thorough discussion of
law and equity courts than is practical here, see generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, The
Relations Between Equity and Law, 11 Mich. L. Rev. 537 (1913), and Henry H. Ingersoll,
Confusion of Law and Equity, 21 Yale L.J. 58 (1911).
67. S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law 22 (1969).
68. Subrin, supra note 62, at 915.
69. See id Interestingly, writs were initially sold by the Chancellor. Id.
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accepting the complaint would group it with the similar ones. 70 At first,
writs were construed liberally to permit an action that did not appear to fit
into one of the existing categories. 71 Over time, however, the writ system
became "a hard and fast system with certain clearly defined things which it
could do and with equally clearly defined things which it could not do."'72
For example, the only remedy that a law court could impose in private
actions was monetary damages, 73 even if it was clear that such a remedy
would not provide complete relief.74 The writ system was so inflexibly
administered that a complainaht whose allegations did not fit into an
existing category was simply barred from pursuing a claim.75
Because many meritorious claims were barred from proceeding by the
rigidity of the law courts, complainants informally appealed directly to the
king for relief.76 These appeals were referred to the head of the Chancery,
the Lord Chancellor.77 In those instances where a "plain, adequate and
complete" remedy was not otherwise available because of a procedural or
substantive deficiency, the Lord Chancellor-the "keeper of the king's
conscience" 78-would have the power to afford relief.79 By the sixteenth
century, the Court of Chancery had developed into a distinct court,
administered by the Chancellor.8" The types of cases heard in these equity
courts ran the gamut from libel and fraud to ordinary commercial disputes
that simply did not fit into one of the strict categories of writs. 8 1 "The bill
in equity became the procedural vehicle for the exceptional case" and
70. See Thomas 0. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 Wash. L.
Rev. 429, 438-39 (2003). The system also developed for efficiency reasons. As the number
of complaints filed grew, the task of reading through each became too onerous for the clerks,
thus they began to require the complainant to identify the category in which his complaint
belonged. See Roger L. Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 81, 92 (1934).
71. Main, supra note 70, at 439.
72. George Burton Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 Colum. L. Rev. 87, 96
(1916); accord Subrin, supra note 62, at 917 (describing the law courts as "igid and
rarefied" and noting that parties could-and often did-lose cases on highly technical
grounds); William Q. de Funiak, Origin and Nature of Equity, 23 Tul. L. Rev. 54, 57 (1948)
("A growing worship of formalism and technicality also began to obsess the courts of law.");
George Palmer Garrett, The Heel of Achilles, 11 Va. L. Rev. 30, 30 (1924) ("The Common
Law made a feti[s]h of procedure.").
73. Main, supra note 70, at 440.
74. This was often the case in property disputes. See Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law
and Equity--Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. Va. L.Q. 21, 28 (1919) (describing
the lone remedy available to law courts as "wholly inadequate" and "as bad as no remedy at
all").
75. See de Funiak, supra note 72, at 56.
76. Main, supra note 70, at 441-42.
77. The Lord Chancellor was usually a bishop familiar with ecclesiastical, civil, and
Roman law. Subrin, supra note 62, at 919.
78. Main, supra note 70, at 441 (internal quotation omitted).
79. Severns, supra note 70, at 84.
80. Subrin, supra note 62, at 918.
81. See Glenn & Redden, supra note 63, at 764.
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permitted the consideration of "the subtleties forbidden by the formalized
writ, such as fraud, mistake, and fiduciary relationships. '82
Although equity eventually "lost its youthful exuberance" as equity
courts developed their own internal system of procedure and became more
confined by precedent, 83 equity courts still exercised an enormous amount
of power vis-A-vis the law courts. 84 Unlike their counterparts in the law
courts, equity judges were "released from confinement to a single writ, a
single form of action, and a single issue" and were not as bound by
precedent. 85 Describing the flexibility of equity as opposed to law, future
Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote that "when the social
needs demand one settlement rather than another, there are times when we
must bend symmetry, ignore history and sacrifice custom in the pursuit of
other and larger ends."'86 The development of equity courts was based on
the recognition of an inherent conflict between the necessity of a uniform
and impartial set of laws87 and the necessity to take individual factors into
account-to recognize that "every case presents a moral problem, and
almost all moral problems are unique." 88  Because equity attempts to
resolve what may well be an irresolvable conflict, it has always been
controversial. 89
It is important to note, however, that a bill in equity could only be filed
where there was not a "plain, adequate and complete" remedy available in
the law courts-the standard that became the test for determining in which
court a case would proceed.90 The rationale for this policy was to preserve
the defendant's right to a jury trial-exclusively available in law courts-
whenever possible. 91 Thus a complainant seeking monetary damages-
82. Subrin, supra note 62, at 918.
83. Main, supra note 70, at 448. According to one commentator, by the middle of the
eighteenth century, "equitable jurisdiction had become so fixed, so certain, that lawyers
could say, 'There is nothing new in equity."' Severns, supra note 70, at 106.
84. See, e.g., Willard Barbour, Some Aspects of Fifteenth-Century Chancery, 31 Harv. L.
Rev. 834, 835 (1918) (arguing that "equity is outside the common law, even antagonistic to
it").
85. Subrin, supra note 62, at 920.
86. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 65 (1921).
87. Second Circuit Judge Henry Friendly called the uniform and impartial application of
law "the most basic principle of jurisprudence." Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About
Discretion, 31 Emory L.J. 747, 758 (1982).
88. Main, supra note 70, at 444-45; accord Johnson v. United States, 186 F.2d 588, 590
(2d Cir. 1951) (Hand, J.) ("Nor is it possible to make use of general principles, for almost
every moral situation is unique; and no one could be sure how far the distinguishing features
of each case would be morally relevant to one person and not to another.").
89. See Sevems, supra note 70, at 82-83.
90. Kittle, supra note 74, at 29 (describing the manner in which "equity courts adopted
the rule that they would not take jurisdiction where there is a complete, adequate and plain
remedy at law"); accord Elias Merwin, The Principles of Equity and Equity Pleading 29
(1895) ("[E]quity will not take jurisdiction whenever there is a plain, adequate, and complete
remedy at common law.").
91. Main, supra note 70, at 451. Before the courts of law and equity were merged in the
United States, the Supreme Court recognized the need to give the defendant the right to a
jury trial as the paramount reason for proceeding at law wherever possible. See Killian v.
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even in conjunction with equitable relief-would first be required to seek
redress in a law court, but one seeking an injunction, disgorgement, 92 or
other equitable relief would be permitted to file a bill of equity. 93
The English common law system is the antecedent to the American legal
system, thus it should come as no surprise that, historically, "[t]he
distinction between law and equity is recognized everywhere in the
jurisprudence of the United States."'94 Beginning in the nineteenth century,
however, a movement of lawyers frustrated with the parallel systems of law
and equity began to advocate for reform. 95 In 1934, Congress enacted the
Rules Enabling Act, which authorized the Supreme Court to "prescribe, by
general rules, for the district courts of the United States and for the courts of
the District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and
motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law."'96 In 1938,
the advisory committee appointed by the Supreme Court to create the rules
promulgated the final version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 97
Rule 2-entitled, significantly, "One Form of Action"-merged the courts
of law and equity: "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil
action.,, 98
Although the American system no longer formally recognizes the
distinction between cases at law and in equity, 99 "equity enjoys a potent...
Ebbinghaus, 110 U.S. 568, 573 (1884) (holding that "whenever a court of law is competent
to take cognizance of a right, and has power to proceed to a judgment which affords a plain,
adequate, and complete remedy, without the aid of a court of equity, the plaintiff must
proceed at law, because the defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by a jury" (internal
quotation omitted)).
92. Disgorgement is an equitable remedy. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424
(1987) (describing the suit at issue in the case as "similar to an action for disgorgement of
improper profits, traditionally considered an equitable remedy").
93. Subrin, supra note 62, at 919-20.
94. United States v. King, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 833, 846 (1849).
95. See Main, supra note 70, at 464-65.
96. Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (2000)).
97. See Main, supra note 70, at 471.
98. Fed. R. Civ. P. 2.
99. In certain areas, however, the distinction continues to play a prominent-even
dispositive-role. One such area is trusts, particularly cases concerning the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, the Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, held that the phrase "equitable relief' in an
ERISA provision had to be interpreted by looking to the common law of trusts and
determining which remedies were available at law and which were available in equity. 508
U.S. 248, 255-59 (1993). Justice Scalia noted, however, the difficulty of this task "[a]s
memories of the divided bench, and familiarity with its technical refinements, recede further
into the past." Id. at 256. For an extensive analysis of ERISA's roots in the common law, as
well as trenchant criticism of the Supreme Court's holding in Mertens and two similar cases,
see John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable ": The Supreme Court's Trail of
Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1317, 1320, 1365 (2003)
(describing "the toll of injustice worked under these rulings" and arguing that "[t]he
Supreme Court needs to confess its error in ERISA remedy law").
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legacy in our unified procedural system."' 100 Courts will often invoke their
broad equitable jurisdiction to award equitable remedies such as
disgorgementi °' and restitution10 2 in addition to money damages-the
traditional form of legal relief-as the particular situation demands. 10 3 In
certain instances, just as the English equity courts once did, American
courts will exercise their equitable jurisdiction in extraordinary ways' 0 4 to
avoid any "injustice that would result from rigorous application of the
common law."' 105
This Comment next discusses three cases in which the Supreme Court
was called upon to delineate the boundaries of the authority a district court
may exercise pursuant to a statutory grant of equitable jurisdiction. These
cases are particularly important because, as this Comment discusses in Part
II, they played a critical role in the interpretation of the equitable grant of
jurisdiction in § 1964(a).
2. Porter v. Warner Holding Co.
Porter v. Warner Holding Co. 10 6 concerned a suit brought by the
Administrator of the Office of Price Administration against a landlord for a
violation of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 ("EPCA"), a statute
enacted by Congress during World War II to "stabilize prices and to prevent
speculative, unwarranted, and abnormal increases in prices and rents. '107
Section 205(a) of the EPCA provides as follows:
Whenever in the judgment of the Administrator any person has engaged
or is about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will
constitute a violation of any provision of section 4 of this Act, he may
make application to the appropriate court for an order enjoining such acts
100. Main, supra note 70, at 476; accord Subrin, supra note 62, at 922 (arguing that
"(t]he underlying philosophy of, and procedural choices embodied in, the Federal Rules [of
Civil Procedure] were almost universally drawn from equity rather than common law").
101. See, e.g., FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 468 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding
that, although the Federal Trade Commission Act does not expressly authorize district courts
to order disgorgement of ill-gained profits "the unqualified grant of statutory authority to
issue an injunction under [the statute] carries with it the full range of equitable remedies,
including the power to grant consumer redress and compel disgorgement of profits").
102. See, e.g., United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 223 (3d Cir. 2005)
(permitting a district court to order restitution under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
although the statute did not specifically authorize restitution because "such specificity is not
required where the government properly invokes a court's equitable jurisdiction under this
statute").
103. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) ("The essence of equity
jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to
the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it.").
104. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17 (1971)
(invoking the judiciary's "historic equitable remedial powers" to order busing as part of the
Supreme Court's unprecedented-and highly controversial--desegregation effort).
105. Subrin, supra note 62, at 918.
106. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
107. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 26-421, 56 Stat. 23, 23-24,
repealed by Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, § 53, 70A Stat. 641.
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or practices, or for an order enforcing compliance with such provision,
and upon a showing by the Administrator that such person has engaged or
is about to engage in any such acts or practices a permanent or temporary
injunction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted without
bond. 108
The Administrator brought suit under § 205(a) against the Warner
Holding Company ("Warner") for charging rent in excess of the law's
maximum in Warner's eight apartment complexes in Minneapolis,
Minnesota. 10 9 The complaint sought an injunction to enjoin Warner from
continuing to charge rent higher than the maximum permitted by law. 1 10
Additionally, the Administrator sought to disgorge from Warner the
difference between the rent its tenants paid and the maximum Warner was
permitted to charge for the period from November 1, 1942 through June 29,
1943.111 The Administrator did not bring this suit under § 205(e) of the
EPCA, however, which authorizes a private party who purchases a
"commodity" priced in excess of the maximum permitted by law to sue to
recover the money, 112 because § 205(e) requires private citizens to bring
such suits within one year of the occurrence, which the tenants in this case
presumably failed to do. 113
The district court enjoined Warner from continuing to collect rent in
excess of the maximum permitted under the EPCA but declined to order
Warner to reimburse its tenants for excess rent paid during the relevant time
period, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to order such restitution under §
205(a) of the EPCA."14 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed. 115
In a sweeping opinion, the Supreme Court reversed. First it addressed
the type of equitable jurisdiction granted by the EPCA: "Unless otherwise
provided by statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the District Court
are available for the proper and complete exercise of that jurisdiction."" 16
Moreover, the Court held that where the suit concerned the public interest
as opposed to private parties, a district court's "equitable powers assume an
108. See Porter, 328 U.S. at 397 (quoting § 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942 ("EPCA")).
109. See id. at 396.
110. See id. at 396-97.
111. See id.
112. Section 205(e) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
If any person selling a commodity violates a regulation, order, or price schedule
prescribing a maximum price or maximum prices, the person who buys such
commodity for use or consumption other than in the course of trade or business
may, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation, except as
hereinafter provided, bring an action against the seller on account of the
overcharge.
Id. at 406 n.9 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting § 205(e) in its entirety).
113. Seeid. at401.
114. See id. at 397.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 398.
2476 [Vol. 74
EQUITY UP IN SMOKE
even broader and more flexible character."" 17 Such powers permit a district
court to "go beyond the matters immediately underlying its equitable
jurisdiction and decide whatever other issues and give whatever other relief
may be necessary under the circumstances. Only in that way can equity do
complete rather than truncated justice."' 18
Because the EPCA granted district courts the full range of equitable
jurisdiction, the Court held that an order to disgorge rent acquired in
violation of the EPCA could therefore be sustained as an "other order"
under the statute, even though disgorgement was not a remedy explicitly
enumerated in the statute. 119 The Court based its decision on one of two
theories. First, such an order could be considered "an equitable adjunct to
an injunction decree."' 120 The Court reasoned that the invocation of a
district court's equitable jurisdiction grants it the power "to decide all
relevant matters in dispute and to award complete relief even though the
decree includes that which might be conferred by a court of law."'121
Alternatively, the Court held that a disgorgement order could be
considered "an order appropriate and necessary to enforce compliance"
with the EPCA. 122 After examining the EPCA's legislative history, the
Court concluded that Congress, in enacting the EPCA, made no attempt to
"catalogue" every type of relief, rather it granted the judiciary the broad
authority to "adapt[] appropriate equitable remedies to specific
situations.' ' 123 An order requiring Warner to reimburse tenants for rent
charged in excess of the maximum set by law was, according to the Court,
such an appropriate equitable remedy.1 24
Because the EPCA did not "in so many words, or by a necessary and
inescapable inference" restrict the district court's inherent equitable powers,
"the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied."' 125
Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the district court
"so that it may exercise the discretion that belongs to it.' 26
117. Id; accord Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937)
(holding that, in the case of a labor dispute, "[c]ourts of equity may, and frequently do, go
much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they
are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved").
118. See Porter, 328 U.S. at 398; cf Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)
(holding that "[a]n appeal to the equity jurisdiction conferred on federal district courts is an
appeal to the sound discretion which guides the determinations of courts of equity" (internal
citation and quotation omitted)).
119. See Porter, 328 U.S. at 398-99.
120. See id. at 399.
121. Id. Contra id. at 406 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Administrator's
right to seek equitable relief under § 205(a) and a private citizen's right to seek legal relief
under § 205(e) are "mutually exclusive, not alternative, rights of recovery").
122. See id. at 400.
123. See id. The Court quoted a Senate Report stating that district courts "are given
jurisdiction to issue whatever order to enforce compliance is proper in the circumstances of
each particular case." Id. at 401 (quoting S. Rep. 77-931, at 10 (1942)).
124. See id. at 400.
125. See id. at 398.
126. See id. at 403.
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The Supreme Court's broad conception of equitable jurisdiction in Porter
remains the touchstone for interpreting statutory grants of equitable
jurisdiction, 127 and Porter plays a critical-even dispositive-role in those
cases determining the availability of disgorgement under § 1964(a), as this
Comment discusses in Part II.
3. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc.
Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc. 128 concerned a suit brought by
the United States Secretary of Labor under § 215(a)(3) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"). 129 The section prohibited, inter alia, an
employer from "discharg[ing] or in any other manner discriminat[ing]
against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this
chapter."' 130 At the time the suit was brought, § 217 of the FLSA granted
district courts jurisdiction
for cause shown, to restrain violations of § 215: Provided, That no court
shall have jurisdiction, in any action brought by the Secretary of Labor to
restrain such violations, to order the payment to employees of unpaid
minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation or an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages in such action.13 1
Several of the defendant's employees sought the assistance of the
Secretary to recover unpaid wages. 132 The Secretary instituted an action
under the FLSA on the employees' behalf.133 According to the district
court's findings of fact, after receiving notice of the action, the defendant
"commenced a course of discriminatory conduct against three of the
complaining employees, culminating in their discharge."' 134
The district court, finding the evidence of retaliatory discrimination
"clear and convincing," granted an injunction against further discrimination
and ordered the reinstatement of the discharged employees. 135  But it
declined to order reimbursement of the employees' lost wages. 136 On
127. See e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 496
(2001) (citing Porter for the proposition that district courts exercise broad discretion that can
be "displaced only by a 'clear and valid legislative command"'); Miller v. French, 530 U.S.
327, 340 (2000) (citing Porter for the proposition that "we should not construe a statute to
displace courts' traditional equitable authority absent.., an 'inescapable inference' to the
contrary").
128. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2000). For an extensive analysis of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 ("FLSA") and its theoretical underpinnings, see Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of
Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 18 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 19, 39-70 (2000).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
131. See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 289 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 217 as it then existed). Congress
amended the statute in 1961. See Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65 (1961).
132. See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 289-90.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that,
under the FLSA, district courts lacked jurisdiction to order reimbursement
of lost wages resulting from an unlawful discharge. 137 The Fifth Circuit
held that jurisdiction 'must be expressly conferred by an act of Congress
or be necessarily implied from a congressional enactment."' 138
"In this," the Supreme Court held in reversing, "the [Fifth Circuit] was
mistaken."' 139 The Court instead held that "'there is inherent in the Courts
of Equity a jurisdiction to. .. give effect to the policy of the
legislature."" 140  The central purpose of the FLSA was to establish
minimum labor standards which would be enforced by employee
complaints to the Secretary of Labor. 141 If employees feared economic
retaliation from their employers for seeking to enforce their rights under the
FLSA, the central purpose of the law would be frustrated. 142 The Court
held that employees should not, consistent with the FLSA, be forced to
choose between enforcing their rights but not receiving reimbursement for
lost wages if their employer unlawfully discharges them, or simply not
enforcing their rights at all. 143 "We cannot read the Act as presenting those
it sought to protect with what is little more than a Hobson's choice."' 144
The Court also rejected the argument advanced by the defendant that, if
the Court permitted reimbursement of the employees' unpaid wages, it
would be violating the FLSA's express prohibition that no court shall have
jurisdiction to order an employer to pay "unpaid minimum wages."'1 45 The
Court examined the legislative history of the FLSA and determined that
Congress intended to preclude courts from ordering recalcitrant employers
to reimburse employees covered by statutes imposing minimum salary
requirements, and not to preclude courts from ordering employers to
reimburse employees whom it wrongfully discharged.' 46 The Court then
137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting the Fifth Circuit opinion).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 292 (quoting Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. 195, 200 (1839)).
141. See id.
142. See id. ("For it needs no argument to show that fear of economic retaliation might
often operate to induce aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard conditions.").
143. See id. at 292-93.
144. Id. at 293.
145. See id. at 294-95.
146. Id. In dissent, Justice Charles Whittaker, joined by Justices Hugo Black and Tom
Clark, argued that the majority's opinion embraced a "fallacy." Id. at 299 (Whittaker, J.,
dissenting).
The only possible basis or theory under which a wrongfully discharged employee
might recover his lost wages is that the attempted discharge, being unlawful, never
became effective, and since he was unlawfully excluded from his job his wages
continued to accrue. It would seem necessarily to follow that an award for those
lost "wages" would be as much one for "unpaid minimum wages or unpaid
overtime compensation" as would an award for "wages" for services actually
performed.... Hence, it seems inescapable that however viewed an award for
wages lost because of an unlawful discharge is one for, or that at least embraces,
unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation or both.
Id. at 299-300.
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remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit to determine if the district court
abused its discretion in declining to order reimbursement of the employees'
lost wages. 147
In Mitchell, the Supreme Court not only continued its tradition, begun in
Porter, of broadly interpreting the authority exercised by a district court
under a statutory grant of equitable authority, but arguably expanded that
interpretation as well, making Mitchell something of a companion case to
Porter for courts interpreting grants of equitable authority.148
4. Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.
In Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.,149 the Supreme Court unanimously
rejected an attempt by a private plaintiff to recover the prior costs of
cleaning up toxic waste under § 6972 of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"). 150  Section 6972(a), the citizen suit
provision of the RCRA, provides a private right of action
against any person.., and including any past or present generator, past or
present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment,
storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to
the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal
of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment. 51
Section 6972(a) grants district courts jurisdiction to "restrain any person
who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling,
storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous
waste... to order such person to take such other action as may be
necessary, or both."'' 52
The plaintiff in Meghrig was KFC Western ("KFC"), which owned and
operated a Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise in Los Angeles. 153 In 1988,
KFC discovered that its property was contaminated with petroleum and was
ordered by the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services to clean
it up. 154 KFC spent approximately $211,000 removing and disposing of
147. See id. at 296.
148. See United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2005)
(noting that, "[i]n Mitchell, the Supreme Court not only reinforced its ruling in Porter, but
expanded its scope as well").
149. 516 U.S. 479 (1996).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2000). The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
("RCRA") is a comprehensive environmental statute that grants the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") broad authority to "regulate hazardous wastes from cradle to
grave." Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). Under the statute, the EPA
has the authority to enforce compliance with a number of handling, record-keeping, storage,
and monitoring requirements. Id. at 332.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
152. Id. § 6972(a).
153. See Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 481.
154. See id.
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soil tainted by the petroleum. 155 Three years later, KFC filed a complaint
against the former owners of the property, the Meghrigs, under the citizen
suit provisions of the RCRA, seeking to recover its cleanup costs. 156 KFC
claimed the solid waste had previously posed an "imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment" and that the Meghrigs had
contributed to the "'past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal.'"1 57
The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the RCRA does
not permit a private citizen to recover past cleanup costs because the statute
only permits such recovery where waste presents an "imminent and
substantial endangerment" at the time the suit is filed. 158 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the RCRA permits
recovery for past cleanup costs if the waste presented an "imminent and
substantial endangerment" at the time it was cleaned up. 159
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed
the Ninth Circuit for two reasons, both based on the Court's interpretation
of the RCRA.160 First, the Court held that the language in § 6972(a)(1)(B),
authorizing private parties to bring suit for hazardous waste which "may
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment," implied that a suit could only be brought when the waste
constituted such an imminent danger at the time the suit is brought-and
not, as the Ninth Circuit held, at the time the waste is cleaned up. 161 The
Court held that "the reference to waste which 'may present' imminent harm
quite clearly excludes waste that no longer presents such a danger.' 162
Second, § 6972(a) authorizes district courts to "restrain" any person from
violating the RCRA, "to order such person to take such other action as may
be necessary," or to do both. 163 The Court interpreted this language to
mean that a private citizen could sue to obtain a mandatory injunction
ordering a party to clean up a presently existing hazard, or obtain a
prohibitory injunction to "restrain" a party from violating the RCRA. 164
"Neither remedy, however, is susceptible of the interpretation adopted by
the Ninth Circuit, as neither contemplates the award of past cleanup
costs . ... "165 Moreover, the Court pointed out that a similar statute, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
155. Id.
156. Id. at 481-82.
157. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)).
158. Id.
159. See KFC W., Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518, 520-21 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 516 U.S.
479 (1996). The Supreme Court referred to the Ninth Circuit's opinion as a "novel
application of federal statutory law." Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 483.
160. See Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 484.
161. Seeid. at 486.
162. Id. at 485-86.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
164. See Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 484.
165. Id.
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of 1980 ("CERCLA")166 "expressly permits the Government to recover 'all
costs of removal or remedial action,"' which the Court interpreted to mean
that "Congress thus demonstrated in CERCLA that it knew how to provide
for the recovery of cleanup costs, and that the language used to define the
remedies under RCRA does not provide that remedy."'
16 7
The Court also rejected an argument advanced by KFC and the
Government, in an amicus curiae brief, that, under Porter and Mitchell,
district courts possess "inherent authority" to award any equitable remedy
unless such a remedy is explicitly taken away by Congress. 168 The Court
held that where Congress has established "'elaborate enforcement
provisions"' for remedying violations of a statute, as it had with the RCRA,
additional remedies cannot be inferred by courts. 169 In language that
seemed to cast doubt on the Court's prior decisions in Porter and
Mitchell-although without explicitly overruling either 17 0-the Court also
held that "'[i]t is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a
statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be
chary of reading others into it.'
17 1
Because the Court concluded that the RCRA could only provide a
remedy that "ameliorates present or obviates the risk of future 'imminent'
harms, not a remedy that compensates for past cleanup efforts," it reversed
the Ninth Circuit and dismissed KFC's complaint. 172
While it may seem that Meghrig signaled an end to the Supreme Court's
broad interpretation of the authority vested in district courts pursuant to
statutory grants of equitable jurisdiction, at least one Court of Appeals has
described Meghrig as a "bump[] in the road" and not a "roadblock[]" to the
analysis set forth by Porter and Mitchell.173 As this Comment discusses in
Part II below, whether a court interpreting a statutory grant of equitable
166. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
167. Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485 (citation omitted). The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") established a standard of
strict liability, with joint and several liability, for four different classes of persons: (1) the
current owners or operators of a facility where hazardous materials were improperly
disposed; (2) the previous owners of such a facility; (3) the transporters of hazardous
materials to or from a facility at which the materials were improperly disposed; and (4) the
individuals who generated the hazardous materials that were ultimately improperly disposed.
See Martina E. Cartwright, Superfund: It's No Longer Super and It Isn't Much of a Fund, 18
Tul. Envtl. L.J. 299, 305-06 (2005). For a general discussion of the history of CERCLA, see
id. at 301-08.
168. See Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 487.
169. See id at 487-88 (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981)).
170. Indeed, Porter has been cited by the Supreme Court as recently as 2001. See supra
note 127 and accompanying text.
171. Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 488 (quoting Middlesex County, 453 U.S. at 14).
172. See id. at 486, 488.
173. United States v. Lane-Labs, Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 230 (1 1th Cir. 2005). The Eleventh
Circuit argued that the nature of the suit at issue in Meghrig-a citizen suit seeking
reimbursement of the cleanup of toxic waste-was sui generis and therefore it would be
inappropriate to read Meghrig as abandoning the course charted in Porter and followed by
Mitchell. Id. at 231, 232 & n.4.
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jurisdiction chooses to treat Meghrig as controlling or as a mere "bump in
the road" will often determine the outcome of the case.
II. THE CIRCUITS SPLIT AS TO THE AVAILABILITY OF DISGORGEMENT AS A
REMEDY UNDER § 1964(A)
As discussed in the preceding part, a district court exercising the full
range of its equitable jurisdiction has significant authority to impose
whatever remedies it deems appropriate. This part describes and analyzes
the three different positions that have emerged as to the extent of the
equitable jurisdiction granted to district courts by § 1964(a) and the
implications of these positions for the availability of disgorgement as a
remedy.
First, this part discusses the Second Circuit's decision in Carson, holding
that § 1964(a) circumscribes a district court's equitable jurisdiction to those
remedies that could "prevent and restrain" future RICO violations. Carson
held, however, that disgorgement could be appropriate where there was a
finding that the money to be disgorged was being used or was capable of
being used to fund further RICO violations. In conjunction with Carson,
this part discusses the Fifth Circuit's decision in Richard, in which the Fifth
Circuit adopted Carson. Second, this part discusses the decision of the
district court in Philip Morris, in which the district court rejected Carson,
holding that § 1964(a) grants district courts the full range of equitable
authority, including the authority to impose disgorgement. Finally, this part
discusses the decision of the D.C. Circuit in Philip Morris, holding, over a
vigorous dissent, that disgorgement is categorically unavailable under §
1964(a).
A. The Second Circuit Holds that § 1964(a) Is Not a General Grant of
Equitable Authority but that Disgorgement Could Nonetheless Be
Permissible Under Certain Circumstances
In United States v. Carson,174 the Second Circuit was confronted with an
issue of first impression-namely, whether disgorgement of ill-gotten gains
was a permissible exercise of a district court's authority under § 1964(a).175
Carson concerned a 1990 civil RICO action brought by the Government in
the Southern District of New York against a former union official. 176
174. 52 F.3d 1173 (2d Cir. 1995).
175. Id. at 1181.
176. Donald J. Carson was the Secretary-Treasurer of Local 1588 of the International
Longshoreman's Association. See id. at 1176. The civil action followed the defendant's
1988 criminal conviction for conspiracy to conduct the affairs of a racketeering enterprise in
the District Court for the District of New Jersey. This conviction was subsequently
overturned by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on a ground unrelated
to the topic of this Comment. See United States v. Carson, 969 F.2d 1480 (3d Cir. 1992).
The U.S. Attorney's office in New Jersey declined the opportunity to re-try Carson on the
criminal charges. See Carson, 52 F.3d at 1179. As discussed supra in note 59 and
accompanying text, a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite for commencing a civil RICO
action.
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Following a bench trial, the district court in Carson entered a judgment in
favor of the Government and ordered the defendant to disgorge $76,100 in
ill-gotten gains. 177
The defendant appealed, presenting six different issues for review. 178 On
the issue of disgorgement, the defendant argued that the district court lacked
the authority to issue an order disgorging the defendant of $76,100 in ill-
gotten gains. 179 Specifically, the defendant argued that because he was
being ordered to disgorge money gained as a result of his racketeering
activities in the 1980's, he could not be ordered to disgorge that money
through a complaint first filed in 1990.180 A remedy such as disgorgement,
the defendant argued, is "available only to prevent ongoing and future
misconduct, and not to remedy past misconduct."' 181 The defendant based
his argument on the language of § 1964(a), which grants district courts
jurisdiction to issue orders to "prevent and restrain" RICO violations. 182
In effect, the defendant argued that disgorgement was unavailable as a
remedy under § 1964(a) because he was no longer engaged in the
racketeering enterprise at the time the suit was brought and, therefore, any
disgorgement order could not serve to "prevent and restrain" future RICO
violations. This the district court found disconcerting.
If [the defendant] is correct that his separation from the union in and of
itself removes this Court's power to grant equitable relief like
disgorgement-because he will no longer be in a position to engage in
labor racketeering-that would mean that a union racketeer, after raiding
the union coffers, need only quit his position in order to retain the ill-
gotten gains of his tenure. We believe that Congress intended to bestow
on the district courts broad equitable powers, including disgorgement, to
prevent such a result. 183
Accordingly, the district court held that disgorgement would be appropriate
in the defendant's case. 184
177. See Carson, 52 F.3d at 1179. The district court also issued a broad injunction
preventing the defendant from having any commercial contact with any labor organization or
organized crime figure. For the text of the injunction, see id. at 1184 n. 10.
178. See id. at 1176. This Comment will only address disgorgement.
179. See id. at 1180.
180. The district court ordered the defendant to disgorge $16,100 he received in
kickbacks between 1981 and 1982 and $60,000 the defendant embezzled from 1982 through
1988. Id. at 1180-81.
181. Id. at 1181 (quoting defendant's brief).
182. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2000).
183. United States v. Local 1804-1, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Nos. 90 Civ. 0963,
5618, 1993 WL 77319, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 1993); accord United States v. Bonanno
Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, 683 F. Supp. 1411, 1448 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
(holding that the imposition of equitable relief such as disgorgement under the securities
laws "lies within the sound discretion of the court. A court exercising the broad equitable
powers of RICO's § 1964 has similar, if not wider, latitude in designing appropriate relief."
(internal citations and quotation omitted)).
184. See Local 1804-1, 1993 WL 77319, at *4-*5.
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The Second Circuit reversed, holding that "[a] plain reading of the statute
does not support the broad interpretation adopted by the district court. ' 185
The jurisdictional authority conferred on district courts in § 1964(a), the
Second Circuit held, "serve[s] the goal of foreclosing future violations, and
do[es] not afford broader redress."' 86 Because the defendant received the
gains sought to be disgorged before the civil action was brought,
disgorgement could not be considered part of an effort to "prevent and
restrain" future RICO violations. 187 Moreover, the Second Circuit noted
that the three remedies 188 enumerated in § 1964(a) were, unlike
disgorgement, forward-looking, and therefore consistent with RICO's
purpose to "prevent and restrain" future violations. 189
In reversing the district court, the Second Circuit rejected a deterrence
argument implicit in the district court's opinion-namely, that any remedy
that inflicts pain on a defendant can be understood as an effort to "prevent
and restrain" future RICO violations. "Categorical disgorgement of all ill-
gotten gains," the Second Circuit held, "may not be justified simply on the
ground that whatever hurts a civil RICO violator necessarily serves to
'prevent and restrain' future RICO violations."' 190 If disgorgement could be
so justified, § 1964(a) would read "prevent, restrain and discourage."' 91
The Second Circuit did not foreclose entirely the possibility of
disgorgement being used as a remedy for ill-gotten gains, however. Indeed,
it held-unfortunately with minimal elaboration-that the remedy would be
appropriate where "there is a finding that the gains are being used to fund or
promote the illegal conduct, or constitute capital available for that
purpose."'192 Within this exception, disgorgement would be "more easily
justifiable" in the case of "gains ill-gotten relatively recently."' 93
185. Carson, 52 F.3d at 1181.
186. Id. at 1182.
187. Id. Although the Second Circuit-rather inexplicably-did not even discuss Porter,
one can infer that it found in the words "prevent and restrain" of § 1964(a) a "necessary and
inescapable inference" restricting the district court's equitable jurisdiction. See Porter v.
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).
188. The three remedies were divestment, injunction, and dissolution. See 18 U.S.C. §
1964(a) (2000).
189. See Carson, 52 F.3d at 1181. But see United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396
F.3d 1190, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 160
(1969), which states that the list of remedies enumerated in § 1964(a) "'is not exhaustive').
190. Carson, 52 F.3d at 1182.
191. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
192. Id.
193. Id. Because it was unclear to the Second Circuit whether the district court had
ordered disgorgement in an effort to "prevent and restrain" future RICO violations-which,
under the Second Circuit's interpretation of the statute, would be permissible-or whether
the district court had ordered disgorgement in an effort to inflict pain on the defendant-
which would be impermissible-the Second Circuit remanded to the district court "for a
determination as to which disgorgement amounts, if any, were intended solely to 'prevent
and restrain' future RICO violations." Id. On remand, the district court held that there was
nothing in the record to "indicate[] that the Court gave any consideration to the need to deter
future conduct when it set the amount of the forfeiture." United States v. Local 1804-1, Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n, Nos. 90 Civ. 0963, 5618, 1996 WL 22377, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22,
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While Carson stands for the proposition that disgorgement could, under
certain circumstances, be available under § 1964(a), it is not entirely clear if
the Second Circuit intended to limit the availability of disgorgement to
instances where specific assets are being used to violate RICO or are
capable of being used for that purpose, or if the remedy could be imposed
upon a finding that a defendant's assets in general are available. "Money is
fungible."'194 It would therefore seem somewhat absurd to only permit
disgorgement in instances where the defendant retained the specific assets
allegedly ill-gained-that is, where he possessed, at the time the suit is
filed, the same $100 bills he received during the course of his unlawful
activity. 195 This, however, is precisely what the tobacco companies would
argue to the D.C. Circuit in Philip Morris196 and appears to be the argument
adopted by the concurring opinion on the D.C. Circuit in that case. 197 Thus,
while Carson clearly holds that § 1964(a) is not a full grant of equitable
jurisdiction but that disgorgement could be permissible under certain
circumstances, there appears to be a great deal of confusion as to what those
circumstances would be.
B. The Fifth Circuit Adopts Carson
In Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chemical Group, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals explicitly adopted the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Carson
regarding disgorgement and civil RICO. 198 Richard concerned a class
action brought by a homeowner against various manufacturers of allegedly
defective polybutylene 199 plumbing components. 200 The plaintiff brought a
RICO action against the manufacturers, asking the district court to disgorge
them of the ill-gotten proceeds of their alleged campaign to misrepresent
1996). Accordingly, the district court held that its prior order disgorging the defendant of ill-
gotten gains could not be affirmed consistent with the Second Circuit's interpretation of §
1964(a). Id.
194. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 606 (2004).
195. Cf SEC v. Banner Fund Int'l, 211 F.3d 602, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (characterizing
such an argument as "monstrous" and noting that "it would perpetuate rather than correct an
inequity").
196. See Appellants' Brief at 48, United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-CV-5252) (arguing that equitable remedies such as disgorgement
are "available only to restore particular property taken from the plaintiff').
197. See infra notes 305-11 and accompanying text.
198. Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Group, 355 F.3d 345, 355 (5th Cir. 2003) ("We
agree with the Second Circuit's reasoning in Carson.").
199. Polybutylene is a type of plastic produced as a by-product of the oil refining process.
See Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Group, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 575, 577 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
200. Richard, 355 F.3d at 347. The plaintiff alleged that the manufacturers engaged in a
fraudulent scheme to mislead buyers into purchasing polybutylene plumbing even though the
manufacturers knew, based on internal scientists' reports, that polybutylene plumbing would
degrade when exposed to the low concentrations of chlorine typical of municipal water
systems. Id. at 348. As a result, the plumbing would leak and cause property damage, for
which the plaintiff claimed the manufacturers were liable. Id.
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the durability of polybutylene plumbing and thereby defraud consumers. 20 1
The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that
equitable remedies such as disgorgement were categorically unavailable to
plaintiffs in civil RICO actions.20 2
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, though not its
reasoning. 20 3 The Fifth Circuit discussed the Second Circuit's decision in
Carson-specifically its holding that disgorgement is, in general, an
available remedy under § 1964 with the qualification that "when
disgorgement is sought for the purpose of compensating a party for past
injuries ... the plain language of § 1964 bars relief. '204 "We agree with the
Second Circuit's reasoning in Carson," the Fifth Circuit held.20 5 Like the
Second Circuit in Carson, however, the Fifth Circuit held that
disgorgement, while available as a remedy under certain circumstances, was
not appropriate in the case before it.20 6 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit held
that, because the defendants no longer manufactured polybutylene
plumbing, disgorgement could not "prevent and restrain" future RICO
violations. 207
Richard also intimated-in a single sentence-a deterrence rationale for
permitting disgorgement as a remedy under civil RICO. The Fifth Circuit
held that the plaintiff "fails to argue that such disgorgement would prevent
manufacturers of similar products from committing similar injuries," 20 8
thus implying that such an argument may have proven persuasive. 20 9
Implicit here is the notion that disgorgement could be justified not only to
"prevent and restrain" the particular defendants in that case from continued
misconduct-which would not be possible, as they were no longer in the
business-but to "prevent and restrain" other members of society from
engaging in similar misconduct-the classic general deterrence
argument. 210 Although such a deterrence rationale seemingly contradicted
201. See Richard, 208 F.R.D. at 580-81. As in the Government's case against the tobacco
companies, the predicate acts alleged under the RICO statute were violations of 18 U.S.C. §§
1341, 1343 (2000) (mail and wire fraud, respectively). Richard, 208 F.R.D. at 580-81.
202. See id. at 588 ("To the extent that courts in the Fifth Circuit have considered
equitable remedies under RICO, the idea has been dismissed.").
203. Richard, 355 F.3d at 354 (holding that disgorgement is an inappropriate remedy
"given the circumstances present in this case").
204. Id. at 354-55.
205. Id. at 355.
206. Id. at 354.
207. Id. at 355.
208. Id.
209. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Jacques Wiener advanced this argument further.
Judge Wiener analogized disgorgement in this case to another equitable remedy, exemplary
damages, "the principal purpose [of which] is not simply to punish the offending parties for
having conspired to make the illicit profits but to convey a strong message, to the
conspirators and to third parties alike, that there is yet another disincentive to engaging in
such proscribed conduct." Id. (Wiener, J., dissenting).
210. Black's Law Dictionary defines general deterrence as follows: "A goal of criminal
law generally, or of a specific conviction and sentence, to discourage people from
committing crimes." Black's Law Dictionary 460 (7th ed. 1999); see also Richard S. Frase,
Punishment Purposes, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 67, 71 (2005) ("General deterrence seeks to
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the Second Circuit's rejection of such a rationale in Carson,211 the Fifth
Circuit nonetheless adopted Carson.
Like Carson, Richard rejected the argument that § 1964(a) represents a
full grant of equitable jurisdiction, but held that disgorgement could be
permissible under § 1964(a) under limited circumstances. For the reasons
discussed above regarding Carson, it is not entirely clear what those
circumstances would be. 212 Richard rejected the use of disgorgement in the
case before it because the defendants were no longer in business,213 but,
because it adopted Carson, the Fifth Circuit presumably agreed that
disgorgement would be appropriate in the case of "gains ill-gotten relatively
recently." 214 Because money is fungible, however, it is simply not clear
why Carson and Richard placed so much weight on the temporal aspect of
the defendant's gains,215 a point that would prove to be critical in later
courts' analyses of Carson and Richard.
C. The D. C. District Court Holds, Contrary to Carson and Richard, that §
1964(a) Is a General Grant of Equitable Jurisdiction Vesting in District
Courts the Authority to Issue Any Relief They Deem Appropriate, Including
Disgorgement
1. The Government's Lawsuit
The Government's complaint against the tobacco companies contained
four counts. The first count was brought under the Medical Care Recovery
Act, which authorizes the Government to recover costs of providing
medical care when such medical care is required because of the tortious
conduct of a third party.216 In its suit, the Government sought to recover
medical costs incurred as a result of treating veterans and federal employees
for smoking-related illnesses.217 The second count was brought under the
Medicare Secondary Payer provisions of the Social Security Act, which
gives the Government a subrogation right against third parties who are
responsible for providing coverage to Medicare recipients but fail to do
so.
2 18 In its suit, the Government sought to recover medical costs incurred
as a result of providing health care to Medicare recipients suffering from
smoking-related illnesses.219
discourage would-be offenders from committing further crimes by instilling a fear of
receiving the penalty given to this offender.").
211. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
213. Richard, 355 F.3d at 355.
214. United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1995).
215. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
216. See 42 U.S.C. § 2651 (2000).
217. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 2, 126-66.
218. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y (2000).
219. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 2, 167-70.
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The third and fourth counts were brought under RICO 2 2 0 and alleged that
the tobacco companies constituted an "enterprise" under RICO, formed not
later than a December 15, 1953, meeting at the Plaza Hotel in New York.221
This enterprise, the Government alleged, "did unlawfully, knowingly, and
intentionally conduct... a pattern of racketeering activity. 22 2  More
specifically, the Government alleged that the enterprise existed to
"coordinate strategy, manipulate scientific data, suppress the truth about the
consequences of smoking, and otherwise further defendants' fraudulent
scheme." 223  The predicate acts alleged were mail and wire fraud,224
violations of which occurred when the tobacco companies, over the course
of several decades, "utilized advertisements and promotions, and. . . made
numerous other public statements through the mails and in broadcasts and
other media, [c]ongressional hearings, and other public appearances as part
of a concerted and coordinated campaign" to mislead the public about the
deleterious effects of smoking, which were alleged to have been known to
the tobacco companies at all times.2 25
As to relief, the Government sought monetary damages for costs it had
incurred and would incur in the future treating smoking-related illnesses, 226
disgorgement of all proceeds obtained as a result of RICO violations227-an
amount the Government would ultimately calculate to be $280 billion228-
and a sweeping injunction to, inter alia, "[p]rohibit each defendant and its
agents from engaging in any public relations endeavor that misrepresents,
or suppresses information concerning, the health risks associated with
cigarette smoking or the addictive nature of nicotine. 2 29 The Government
220. Count three was for substantive RICO violations while count four was for
conspiracy to violate RICO. See id. § VI.A, C.
221. See id. 174-75.
222. Id. 172.
223. See id. 182.
224. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2000) (mail and wire fraud, respectively).
225. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 2, 177.
226. See id. § VII.A. 1-3.
227. See id. § VII.B.1.
228. The $280 billion figure was the calculation of a Government expert that appeared in
the Government's Preliminary Proposed Findings of Law. See United States v. Philip
Morris, USA, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 72, 74 n.4 (D.D.C. 2004).
229. First Amended Complaint, supra note 2, § VII.B.2.d. The Government also asked
the district court to require the tobacco companies to fund a smoking cessation campaign.
See id. § VII.B.2.i. At the close of the nine-month trial in June 2005, the Government
requested $10 billion to fund this campaign, despite testimony from the Government's own
expert witness that such a campaign would cost $130 billion, leading Judge Kessler to
remark in open court that the Government's revised request "suggests that additional
influences have been brought to bear on what the government's case is." Janofsky &
Johnston, supra note 20. Other commentary was much less subtle. See Editorial, Torpedoing
a Tobacco Suit, N.Y. Times, June 10, 2005, at A20 (editorializing that the Government's
shift represented "an egregious example of favoritism toward a big politically connected
industry"); see also supra note 4 (discussing the impact of the 2000 presidential election on
the case).
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further requested any relief the district court deemed "necessary and
appropriate to prevent and restrain" further RICO violations.230
2. The District Court Rejects the Tobacco Companies' Motion to Dismiss
the Case
The tobacco companies moved to dismiss the case. 231 The district court
granted the tobacco companies' motion on the first and second counts but
denied it on the RICO counts.232 The tobacco companies did not address
the specific elements of the Government's RICO claims in their motion to
dismiss, but rather argued that the Government had failed to prove that the
tobacco companies' putative RICO violations would continue in the future,
so as to warrant the broad equitable relief sought by the Government. 233
The district court rejected the tobacco companies' arguments.
To obtain injunctive relief, the district court held, "a plaintiff must show
that the defendant's past unlawful conduct indicates a reasonable likelihood
of further violation(s) in the future," 234 which is evaluated by applying a
three-part test set forth by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in SEC
v. First City Financial Corp.235 The First City test involves the following
three factors: "[W]hether a defendant's violation was isolated or part of a
pattern, whether the violation was flagrant and deliberate or merely
technical in nature, and whether the defendant's business will present
opportunities to violate the law in the future. '236 While courts consider
each factor, no single one is determinative and "the district court should
determine the propensity for future violations based on the totality of
circumstances." 237
230. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 2, § VII.B.3.
231. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9.
232. See United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134 (D.D.C. 2000).
For the district court's decision on the first two counts, which will not be discussed in this
Comment, see id. at 138-46.
233. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 38-50.
234. Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 148 (citation and internal quotation omitted);
accord United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, 871 F.2d 401,
408-09 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that, under § 1964(a), "the district court is authorized to
fashion appropriate equitable relief to prevent future violations of [RICO]. Whether such
relief is appropriate under § 1964(a) depends on whether there exists a likelihood that
wrongful acts will be committed in the future"); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351,
1358 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that "[w]hether equitable relief is appropriate [under §
1964(a)] depends, as it does in other cases in equity, on whether a preponderance of the
evidence shows a likelihood that the defendants will commit wrongful acts in the future");
see also SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1477 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding a
district court's order of equitable relief where there was a likelihood of future violations of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1498 &
n.14 (10th Cir. 1995) (observing that injunctive relief is only appropriate where there is a
finding that the defendant will be likely to violate the law in the future); SEC v. Bilzerian, 29
F.3d 689, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same); SEC v. Gruenberg, 989 F.2d 977, 978 (8th Cir. 1993)
(same).
235. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., Ltd., 890 F.2d 1215, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
236. Id.
237. Id.
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The district court, presuming the veracity of the Government's
allegations, as it must on a motion to dismiss, 2 38 held that the Government
had "clearly and overwhelmingly satisfied each of the three First City
factors." 239  First, the Government's complaint alleged more than one
hundred acts of wire and mail fraud,240 occurring over several decades.24 1
Second, the Government's complaint did not allege "technical" violations,
but rather a "concerted and coordinated campaign" 242 of fraudulent and
misleading statements about the effects of cigarette smoking.243 As to the
final factor, the district court merely pointed out that the tobacco companies
remained in the business of manufacturing and selling cigarettes, and
therefore would have "countless" opportunities to violate the law in the
future. 244
The district court also rejected the tobacco companies' argument that
disgorgement is not, as a matter of law, an available remedy under civil
RICO. Significantly, because of the way the district court disposed of the
issue-as requiring a factual finding-it was never required to address the
argument's merits. The district court noted that the Second Circuit was the
only federal appellate court to address the availability of disgorgement in a
civil RICO suit 245 and that the Second Circuit held it was indeed available,
albeit under limited circumstances 246 But the district court interpreted the
Second Circuit's decision in Carson in such a way as to require it to reject
the tobacco companies' argument as premature.
The Court of Appeals in Carson observed that whether disgorgement
is appropriate in a particular case depends on whether there is a 'finding
that the gains are being used to fund or promote the illegal conduct, or
constitute capital available for that purpose." 52 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis
added). This Court has not made such a finding, nor could it at this stage.
So long as disgorgement is permitted in civil RICO suits as a matter of
law, as the Court so concludes, it would not be appropriate to ask, at the
present stage, whether the Government has proved that it has an adequate
basis for seeking such a remedy. 247
238. For a court considering a motion to dismiss, "the only relevant factual allegations are
the plaintiffs', and they must be presumed to be true." Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 135
(citation and internal quotation omitted). "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief" Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-
46(1957).
239. Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 149.
240. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 2, 206.
241. Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 149.
242. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 2, 177.
243. Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 149.
244. Id.
245. The Fifth Circuit did not consider the issue until 2003 in a case called Richard v.
Hoechst Celanese Chemical Group, 355 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2003); see supra Part lB.
246. Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 151.
247. Id.
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Because the district court interpreted Carson to first require a factual
finding that ill-gotten gains are being used or "constitute capital available"
for use in committing future RICO violations, it denied the tobacco
companies' motion as to the RICO claim.248
3. The District Court Rejects the Tobacco Companies' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment
The tobacco companies did not appeal the decision permitting the RICO
claims to move forward. Instead, three years later, they moved for partial
summary judgment,249 asking the district court to rule that the text of §
1964(a) and the Second Circuit's decision in Carson precluded the
imposition of disgorgement as a remedy. 250 Additionally, the tobacco
companies argued that the Government's economic model, used to calculate
the $280 billion which the Government sought to disgorge, was flawed as a
matter of law. 25 1 The district court rejected both arguments.
As a threshold matter, the district court again held252 that in order to
"prevent and restrain" future RICO violations, there must be "a reasonable
likelihood of future RICO violations prior to entering any order of
injunctive relief or disgorgement. ''253 The likelihood of future violations is
"'frequently established by inferences drawn from past conduct"' such as
"the nature, seriousness, and extent of past violations." 254 Because the
"nature, seriousness, and extent" of the tobacco companies' past RICO
violations, if any, were disputed, the district court held summary judgment
was premature, just as it had held years earlier in response to the tobacco
companies' motion to dismiss.255
The district court then addressed the tobacco companies' argument that
the limitation placed upon disgorgement by Carson and Richard256
248. Id, at 151-52.
249. On a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party-in this case, the Government. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
250. See Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 15, at 18-26.
251. This Comment will not address this issue. For the tobacco companies' argument,
see id. at 8-18. For the district court's discussion-and rejection-of the tobacco
companies' argument regarding the Government's economic model, see United States v.
Philip Morris USA, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 72, 81-82 (D.D.C. 2004).
252. See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text, discussing the district court's
opinion, in response to the tobacco companies' motion to dismiss, holding that the
imposition of injunctive relief requires proof of a likelihood of future RICO violations.
253. Philip Morris, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 76; accord United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d
1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974).
254. Philip Morris, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 75 n.5 (quoting United States v. Local 30, Tile &
Composition Roofers, 871 F.2d 401, 409 (3d Cir. 1989)); see also cases cited supra note
234.
255. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
256. Perhaps because Carson preceded Richard, the district court in Philip Morris
references both cases by citing only Carson, a convention this Comment will follow.
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precluded disgorgement as a remedy in the current case.257 In Carson, the
Second Circuit held that disgorgement of gains ill-gotten long in the past
would not be permissible unless such gains were "being used to fund or
promote the illegal conduct, or constitute capital available for that
purpose." 258  The district court rejected this limitation, offering five
interrelated reasons. 259
First, the district court held that Carson was inconsistent with the text of
§ 1964(a) itself. Conceiving disgorgement as a form of deterrence,260 the
district court pointed out that it is not at all clear that deterrence is
incompatible with the statutory charge to "prevent and restrain," and cited
several definitions of the word "deter" that include the words "prevent," and
"restrain." 261 While acknowledging that there are "minor differences of
nuance" among the words "deter," "discourage," "prevent," and "restrain,"
the district court held that such "slight" differences are "surely not
sufficient to justify the differing treatment accorded them by the Second
Circuit."2
62
Second, the district court held that Carson's limitation was inconsistent
with RICO's legislative history and purpose. In Carson, the Second Circuit
concluded that "prevent and restrain" could not justify a remedy such as
disgorgement merely because the remedy inflicts pain; if it could, § 1964(a)
would read "prevent, restrain and discourage." 263 The district court rejected
Carson's conclusion, holding that such a "narrow interpretation of Section
1964(a) cannot be squared with Congress'[s] intention that this provision be
read broadly," citing a Senate Report granting federal courts the authority
under RICO to "craft equitable relief broad enough to do all that is
257. The district court also noted that, contrary to the tobacco companies' argument, it
had never adopted the limitation Carson placed on disgorgement in its decision on the
tobacco companies' motion to dismiss. Rather, it had discussed Carson in response to the
tobacco companies' argument that disgorgement was never a remedy available under RICO.
See Philip Morris, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 76 n.7.
258. United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1995).
259. In rejecting the limitation Carson placed upon disgorgement as a remedy under
RICO, the district court necessarily rejected the tobacco companies' argument that
disgorgement was inconsistent with the "prevent and restrain" language of § 1964(a), though
it did not explicitly do so.
260. Disgorgement is generally considered to have a deterrent effect. See SEC v. Sargent,
329 F.3d 34, 41 & n.2 (1st Cir. 2003); Balance Dynamics Corp. v. Schmitt Indus., Inc., 204
F.3d 683, 695 & n.6 (6th Cir. 2000); In re Bilzerian, 153 F.3d 1278, 1283 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
261. Philip Morris, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (citing Black's Law Dictionary, Oxford English
Dictionary, and Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary).
262. Id. at 77-78. Moreover, specific language in § 1964(a) would appear to preclude any
limitation on the equitable authority a district court may exercise thereunder. For example,
the words "appropriate remedies"-analogous to the words "appropriate orders" in §
1964(a)--"connote[] the remedial discretion which is the hallmark of equity." West v.
Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 225-26 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (interpreting the words
"appropriate remedies" under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). The word
"including" in § 1964(a) "makes clear that [the appropriate orders] are not limited to the
examples that follow that word." Id. at 218 (majority opinion).
263. Carson, 52 F.3d at 1182 (internal quotation omitted).
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necessary." 264  Moreover, Carson's limitation on disgorgement was also
contrary to one of the purposes of RICO, namely to "divest [an enterprise]
of the fruits of its ill-gotten gains. 265
Third, the district court held that Carson's interpretation of § 1964(a)
was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's 1946 holding in Porter v.
Warner Holding Co.266 In Porter,267 the Supreme Court interpreted the
extent of the equitable jurisdiction available to a district court by a statute
that granted authority to issue "a temporary injunction, restraining order, or
other order."268 The Supreme Court held that
the comprehensiveness of [a court's] equitable jurisdiction is not to be
denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command.
Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable
inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that
jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. 269
Because § 1964(a) contains neither a "clear and valid legislative
command" nor a "necessary and inescapable inference" limiting
disgorgement to funds available to continue to violate RICO, the district
court in Philip Morris concluded that Carson's restriction on § 1964(a)'s
scope was inconsistent with Porter.270 Moreover, the district court noted
that Carson's divergence from Porter was particularly improper in the case
of § 1964(a), of which the Supreme Court has held, "'if Congress'[s]
liberal-construction mandate is to be applied anywhere, it is in Section
1964, where RICO's remedial purposes are most evident.' ' 271
Fourth, the district court held that Carson's interpretation of § 1964(a)
was inconsistent with the interpretations of other federal courts interpreting
similarly worded provisions. 272 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for
264. Philip Morris, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (citing S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 160 (1969))
(internal quotation omitted).
265. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981).
266. Philip Morris, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 78.
267. 328 U.S. 395 (1946). This case is discussed at length supra Part I.B.2.
268. Id. at 397.
269. Id. at 398.
270. See Philip Morris, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 78.
271. Id. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 492 n.10 (1985)); see also
Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) (holding that "'there is
inherent in the Courts of Equity a jurisdiction to... give effect to the policy of the
legislature' (quoting Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. 195, 200 (1839))).
272. Philip Morris, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 78. For a case permitting a district court to
exercise the full range of equitable jurisdiction without an explicit statutory authorization,
see Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1223 (7th Cir. 1979)
(holding that, although the Commodity Exchange Act did not contain a provision expressly
authorizing the equitable relief sought by the Government, "neither does [the Act] have any
provision restricting the equitable power of the district court. Porter and Mitchell indicate
that the latter fact is a sufficient basis for concluding that a district court possesses the
authority to order restitution pursuant to the Commodity Exchange Act."). For cases
following the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hunt, see Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n
v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1982) (following the Seventh
Circuit's holding in Hunt); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. British Am. Commodity
Options Corp., 788 F.2d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 1986) (same); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n
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example, grants district courts authority to "'enjoin [violations of the Act],
and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or
restraining order shall be granted.' '"273 Although the Securities Exchange
Act, like RICO, does not explicitly provide for disgorgement, the D.C.
Circuit has held that disgorgement is an appropriate remedy under the
Act.274 Moreover, the district court noted that no court has limited the ill-
gotten gains eligible for disgorgement under the Securities Exchange Act to
those that "are being used to fund or promote the illegal conduct, or
constitute capital available for that purpose," as Carson required for
disgorgement under civil RICO. 275
Finally, the district court reasoned that following Carson's approach
would lead to absurd results inconsistent with prior decisions of the D.C.
Circuit. In SEC v. Banner Fund International,276 a defendant convicted of
securities violations argued that he could not comply with the disgorgement
order imposed because he no longer had access to the assets at issue
(approximately $9 million). The D.C. Circuit upheld the district court's
disgorgement order, holding that "disgorgement is an equitable obligation
to return a sum equal to the amount wrongfully obtained, rather than a
requirement to replevy a specific asset. ' 277 The D.C. Circuit in Banner
Fund concluded that it would be "absurd" to allow a defendant to spend his
ill-gotten gains before an action can be brought against him in order to
immunize himself from a disgorgement order.278 The district court in
Philip Morris found that it would be similarly "absurd" to immunize the
tobacco companies from an order of disgorgement simply because they had
disposed of the proceeds of their RICO violations and therefore, under
Carson, could not use such proceeds to continue to violate RICO.279
v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 76 (3d Cir. 1993) (same). See also FTC v. Gem
Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 468 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (construing the language "to enjoin" in the
Federal Trade Commission Act to "carr[y] with it the full range of equitable remedies").
273. Philip Morris, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2000)).
274. See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., Ltd., 890 F.2d 1215, 1229-31 (D.C. Cir.
1989); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that, in light of the broad
equitable jurisdiction conferred on district courts by the Securities Exchange Act,
disgorgement "is by no means a new addition to this catalogue of permissible equitable
remedies"); accord SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctr., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir. 1972)
(holding that disgorgement is an appropriate remedy under the Securities Exchange Act
"[o]nce the equity jurisdiction of the district court has been properly invoked by a showing
of a securities law violation").
275. Philip Morris, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 78.
276. SEC v. Banner Fund Int'l, 211 F.3d 602 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
277. Id. at 617.
278. Id. ("Under [the defendant's] approach, for example, a defendant who was careful to
spend all the proceeds of his fraudulent scheme, while husbanding his other assets, would be
immune from an order of disgorgement. [This] would be a monstrous doctrine for it would
perpetuate rather than correct an inequity.").
279. Philip Morris, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 80. The district court also addressed the tobacco
companies' argument that Banner Fund and other cases relied upon by the court concerned
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, among others, and were therefore
inapposite in the RICO proceeding: "[N]either the Second Circuit nor Defendants offer any
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Because the district court had previously held that disgorgement is
generally a remedy available under civil RICO 280 and because it rejected
the "narrow limitation" that Carson attempted to engraft onto RICO, it
denied the tobacco companies' motion for partial summary judgment.
The district court in Philip Morris advanced a broad and sweeping
interpretation of the equitable authority exercised by a district court under §
1964(a). In so doing, the district court adhered very much to the spirit of
Porter and Mitchell in its dogged insistence on a "clear and valid legislative
command" or a "necessary and inescapable inference" before interpreting a
statute to circumscribe a district court's inherent equitable authority. 281
Because the district court found no such command or inference in §
1964(a)'s text or legislative purpose, it found no reason to preclude
disgorgement--or any other equitable remedy-as a matter of law.
D. The D.C. Circuit Holds that § 1964(a) Is Not a General Grant of
Equitable Jurisdiction and Categorically Rejects the Availability of
Disgorgement Under § 1964(a)
The tobacco companies appealed the district court's decision to the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. In United States v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc.,282 a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit, after granting the
tobacco companies' interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 283
reversed the ruling of the district court, over a vigorous dissent. The D.C.
Circuit held that the language in § 1964(a) "indicates that the jurisdiction is
limited to forward-looking remedies that are aimed at future violations." 284
Disgorgement, the D.C. Circuit held, "is a quintessentially backward-
looking remedy focused on remedying the effects of past conduct to restore
reason to conclude that disgorgement in RICO cases does not serve the very same purposes
(deterrence and deprivation of unjust enrichment) as it does in securities cases." Id. at 79-80.
280. See supra Part II.C.2.
281. See supra Part I.B.2-3 for discussions of Porter and Mitchell, respectively, and their
broad interpretations of a district court's equitable authority.
282. 396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 478 (2005). For a
discussion of the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, see Greenhouse, supra note 20.
283. The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of
Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon,
in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order ....
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000). The majority and dissent hotly disputed whether, under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b), it was even appropriate for the Court to consider whether disgorgement
was generally available under RICO. Compare Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1193-97 (majority
opinion arguing that the court could consider disgorgement generally), with id.at 1209-14
(Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[b]ecause the tobacco companies ask us to address an
issue not fairly included in the certified order and not presented at that time to the district
court, I would dismiss this interlocutory appeal").
284. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1198.
2496 [Vol. 74
EQUITY UP IN SMOKE
the status quo." 285  The D.C. Circuit rejected not only the broad claim
advanced by the Government-that all equitable remedies, including
disgorgement, are available under § 1964(a)-but also the narrower one-
that disgorgement is available as a remedy within the narrow exception
carved out by Carson.286
1. The D.C. Circuit Interprets § 1964(a) to Circumscribe a District Court's
Equitable Authority
The Government argued that "[w]hen Congress provided the district
courts with 'jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations' of RICO by
'issuing appropriate orders,' it clearly would have understood that its grant
of authority did not divest a court of inherent equitable powers," among
them the power to order disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.287 The D.C.
Circuit disagreed, characterizing the Government's argument as advocating
a "plenary grant of equitable jurisdiction" wholly incompatible with the
limited jurisdiction conferred on federal courts by Congress and the
Constitution. 288 The D.C. Circuit held that the language of the statute
precluded such a broad reading.289 The "prevent and restrain" language in
§ 1964 limited a district court's equitable jurisdiction to forward-looking
remedies aimed at preventing and restraining future RICO violations.290
Disgorgement is not a forward-looking remedy, but rather a
"quintessentially backward-looking" one that is "measured by the amount
of prior unlawful gains and is awarded without respect to whether the
defendant will act unlawfully in the future. Thus it is both aimed at and
measured by past conduct."'291
The D.C. Circuit also addressed the argument that disgorgement could be
understood as a forward-looking remedy because of its ability to deter
285. Id.
286. The Government argued that, absent an express statutory provision, a district court
retained all inherent equitable authority, including the power to order disgorgement. See
Brief for the United States of America as Appellee at 14-17, Philip Morris, 396 F.3d 1190
(No. 04-CV-5252) [hereinafter Government Brief]. In the alternative, the Government
argued that disgorgement would be appropriate in this case within the narrow exception
carved out by Carson, as a means of preventing ongoing and future RICO violations. See id.
at 30-39.
287. Id. at 18 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2000)).
288. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1197-98; accord Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (holding that district courts "are courts of limited
jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is
not to be expanded by judicial decree" (citations omitted)). But see Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) (holding that Congress has the authority to regulate a
district courts' equitable jurisdiction, "but we do not lightly assume that Congress has
intended to depart from established principles" absent a clear indication of such intent).
289. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1197 ("We will not expand upon our equitable
jurisdiction if, as here, we are restricted by the statutory language ....
290. Id. at 1198.
291. Id. But see supra notes 234-44, 252-55 and accompanying text (discussing the
district court's holding that disgorgement would only be an appropriate remedy where there
is first a finding of a likelihood of future RICO violations).
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future violations. 292 While the D.C. Circuit agreed with the argument
generally-that disgorgement could "prevent and restrain" future violations
"insofar as it makes RICO violations unprofitable"-it believed the
argument "goes too far." 293  The D.C. Circuit quoted Carson: "If
[deterrence] were adequate justification, the phrase 'prevent and restrain'
would read 'prevent, restrain, and discourage,' and would allow any remedy
that inflicts pain."294  A concurring opinion by Judge Williams further
addressed the deterrence issue, arguing it was unlikely Congress intended §
1964(a) to authorize disgorgement because it would have "only a trivial
incremental effect" on deterrence in light of the far harsher punishments-
e.g., criminal forfeiture, treble damages-explicitly authorized by the RICO
statute. 295
The D.C. Circuit also addressed the Government's argument that the text
of § 1964(a)-which authorizes district courts to "prevent and restrain"
violations of RICO "by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not
limited to"--provides for a broad grant of equitable jurisdiction. 296 The
D.C. Circuit held that the words "including, but not limited to" in § 1964(a)
"introduce a non-exhaustive list that sets out specific examples of a general
principle"-namely, those remedies that "prevent and restrain." 297
Applying the statutory interpretation canons of noscitur a sociis298 and
ejusdem generis,299 the D.C. Circuit held that the three remedies
enumerated in the statute--divestment, injunction, and dissolution-raise a
"'necessary and inescapable inference' ... that Congress intended to limit
relief under § 1964(a) to forward-looking orders, ruling out
292. See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1200.
293. Id.
294. United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1995). But see George Lee
Flint, Jr., ERISA: Extracontractual Damages Mandated for Benefit Claims Actions, 36 Ariz.
L. Rev. 611, 638-40 (1994) (referring to courts' expectations that Congress will explicitly set
forth every remedy it intends to provide as the "specificity myth").
295. See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1203-04 (Williams, J., concurring). Judge Stephen
Williams illustrated his point with the following scenario:
I find it hard to imagine a waffling villain-already in court for RICO violations-
saying to himself: "Well, my chances of escaping § 1963(a) forfeiture and
imprisonment because of the statute of limitations and the burden of proof, and of
escaping treble damages under § 1964(c), and contempt penalties for violating the
court's orders, still leave RICO violations attractive on a net basis; but that implied
disgorgement under § 1964(a)-wow! Too much. It tilts me over the line."
Id. at 1204.
296. See Government Brief, supra note 286, at 17-19.
297. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1200.
298. This term means, literally, "it is known by its associates." Black's Law Dictionary,
supra note 210, at 1084 ("A canon of construction holding that the meaning of an unclear
word or phrase should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it.").
299. This term means, literally, "of the same kind or class." Id at 535 ("A canon of
construction that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specific persons or things,
the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only persons or things of the same
type as those listed. For example, in the phrase horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, goats, or any
other barnyard animal, the general language or any other barnyard animal--despite its
seeming breadth-would probably be held to include only four-legged, hoofed mammals
(and thus would exclude chickens).").
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disgorgement. ' '30 0 Because disgorgement is not a forward-looking remedy,
the D.C. Circuit categorically rejected its use in civil RICO actions.
2. The D.C. Circuit Rejects Carson and Richard
Although the D.C. Circuit categorically rejected the use of disgorgement,
it nonetheless addressed the Government's narrower argument that
disgorgement could be justified in the case within the exception carved out
by Carson301 and Richard because the tobacco companies were alleged to
have obtained billions of dollars through racketeering activities and could
use these proceeds to continue to violate the law.30 2 The D.C. Circuit
rejected this argument because it disagreed with Carson and Richard's
qualified acceptance of the availability of disgorgement under § 1964(a). 30 3
While we avoid creating circuit splits when possible, in this case we can
find no justification for considering any order of disgorgement to be
forward-looking as required by § 1964(a). The language of the statute
explicitly provides three alternative ways to deprive RICO defendants of
control over the enterprise and protect against future violations:
divestment, injunction, and dissolution. We need not twist the language
to create a new remedy not contemplated by the statute. 304
Judge Stephen Williams's concurrence further elucidated what he
regarded as the Second Circuit's "superficially appealing interpretation" of
§ 1964(a) in Carson.305
Carson held that disgorgement could "prevent and restrain" future RICO
violations if the disgorgement were limited to those ill-gotten gains "being
used to fund or promote the illegal conduct, or constitut[ing] capital
available for that purpose. ' 306  Judge Williams-who appeared to read
300. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1200 (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S.
395, 398 (1946)); accord Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204,
209 (2002) (expressing the Court's reluctance to "extend[] remedies not specifically
authorized by [a statute's] text"); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 254 (1993)
(holding that a "detailed enforcement scheme provides strong evidence that Congress did not
intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly" (internal
quotation omitted)); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (instructing that
when "construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress
used"); Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that, when
interpreting a statute all language must be given effect because "Congress cannot be
presumed to do a futile thing"-namely, include superfluous language in a statute).
301. "Ordinarily, the disgorgement of gains ill-gotten long in the past will not serve the
goal of 'prevent[ing] and restrain[ing]' future violations unless there is a finding that the
gains are being used to fund or promote the illegal conduct, or constitute capital available for
that purpose." United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2000)) (alterations in original).
302. See Government Brief, supra note 286, at 30-32.
303. See supra notes 192-93, 204-12 and accompanying text (discussing the
circumstances under which Carson and Richard, respectively, held that disgorgement would
be permissible under § 1964(a)).
304. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1201.
305. Id. at 1202 (Williams, J., concurring).
306. Carson, 52 F.3d at 1182.
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Carson to mean that only those specific assets illegally obtained could be
disgorged 307-pointed out that making this determination would be a nearly
impossible task in the case of the tobacco companies. 30 8 Would a court
simply conclude that all the tobacco companies' assets could be used to
commit future RICO violations and order the companies into
bankruptcy? 309 Or would a court attempt to determine, for example, which
assets Altria Group, Inc.-the parent company of Philip Morris as well as
multiple nontobacco companies 310-was using for the marketing and sale
of cigarettes and which it was using for the marketing and sale of Oreo
cookies? The concurrence rejected this "virtually metaphysical quest to
draw lines based on the likelihood that particular resources will be devoted
to crime." 311
If the district court's opinion in Philip Morris represents an exceptionally
broad interpretation of § 1964(a), 312 then the D.C. Circuit's reversal
represents an exceptionally narrow one. Under the D.C. Circuit's
interpretation, § 1964(a) severely circumscribes a district court's equitable
jurisdiction through a Porter-style "clear and valid legislative
command. '313 This statutory command permits few remedies beyond those
specifically enumerated, and particularly not a "backward-looking" remedy
such as disgorgement, even if the disgorgement were tailored, as Carson
and Richard advocated, at "gains ill-gotten relatively recently." 314
3. The Dissent
In a vigorous dissent, Judge David Tatel argued forcefully that the
majority erred in rejecting both the broad and narrow arguments advanced
by the Government, 315 and in so doing "ignore[d] controlling Supreme
Court precedent, disregard[ed] Congress's plain language, and create[ed] a
circuit split." 316
307. See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text (discussing the problematic nature of
this reading of Carson).
308. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1203 (Williams, J., concurring).
309. The concurrence points out that the tobacco companies sued by the Government
almost certainly have a combined net worth below the $280 billion sought. See id. at 1202.
It is far from clear, however, that some sort of settlement, whereby the tobacco companies
would have been compelled to set up a trust to make payments over an extended period of
time, would have been beyond the companies' financial means. For a discussion of a
massive, multi-billion dollar trust established by the Johns-Manville Corporation, one of the
world's largest asbestos manufacturers, to compensate future victims of asbestosis, see Frank
J. Macchiarola, The Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust: Lessons for the Future, 17
Cardozo L. Rev. 583, 591-602 (1996).
310. See Altria at a Glance, http://www.altria.com/aboutaltria/1 1_altriaataglance.asp
(last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
311. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1203 (Williams, J., concurring).
312. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
313. See supra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of Porter.
314. United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1995).
315. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
316. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1208 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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Judge Tatel first addressed the majority's rejection of the argument that §
1964(a) confers broad equitable authority on the district courts. Whereas
the majority relied exclusively on the Supreme Court's decision in
Meghrig,317 Judge Tatel argued that Porter318 and MitchelP1 9 were
controlling for three reasons. 320 First, the statute at issue in Mitchell, the
FLSA, more closely resembled RICO than the statute at issue in Meghrig,
the RCRA, because "[b]oth RICO and the EPCA stand alone in grappling
with a broad social issue, whereas the RCRA had a closely related statute
[CERCLA] on which the Court in Meghrig relied heavily." 321 Second, in
Porter and Mitchell the Government brought the suit, and Porter held that a
district court's "equitable powers assume an even broader and more flexible
character"322 in a case implicating the public interest.323 Finally, Meghrig's
suggestion that the language "to restrain" in the RCRA only referred to
prohibitory injunctions cannot be reconciled with § 1964(a), which
explicitly authorizes other remedies. 324
Judge Tatel believed Porter and Mitchell, and not Meghrig, should
control, and argued that there was no basis in either decision to deny district
courts full equitable jurisdiction under the grant of 1964(a). Porter held
that "the comprehensiveness of [a district court's] equitable jurisdiction is
not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative
command. '325 The dissent could find no such "clear and valid legislative
command" in § 1964(a). 326 Because Porter and Mitchell both contained
statutory language similar to that of § 1964(a) which the Supreme Court
interpreted as a grant of full equitable jurisdiction, the dissent argued that
the district court "may order whatever equitable relief it deems
appropriate," including disgorgement. 327
Judge Tatel also argued that the majority erred in rejecting the argument
that disgorgement could be understood as a remedy to "prevent and
restrain" future RICO violations.328  Because the district court held-
correctly, in Judge Tatel's view-that disgorgement would only be a
permissible remedy upon a finding that the defendants are likely to violate
RICO in the future,329 it was a question of fact. 33 0 Because the Government
317. See supra Part I.B.4 for a detailed discussion of this case.
318. See supra Part I.B.2 for a detailed discussion of this case.
319. See supra Part I.B.3 for a detailed discussion of this case.
320. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1220 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
321. Id. at 1220-21.
322. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).
323. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1221 (Tatel, J., dissenting); accord United States v. Alisal
Water Corp. 427 F.3d 597, 608 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Porter for the proposition that a
district court's equitable powers are even broader in a case involving the public as opposed
to private interests).
324. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1221 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
325. Porter, 328 U.S. at 398.
326. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1216 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
327. Id. at 1222.
328. Id.
329. See supra notes 234-44, 252-55 and accompanying text.
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presented evidence in the form of expert testimony to the effect that a
disgorgement order would indeed prevent RICO violations in the future-
evidence which a court, on a motion for summary judgment, must accept as
true33 '-Judge Tatel argued that summary judgment was inappropriate.
Judge Tatel also disagreed with the majority's arguments as to why
disgorgement could not "prevent and restrain" future RICO violations.
First, he rejected the majority's characterization of disgorgement as a
"quintessentially backward-looking remedy," 332 relying on Porter for the
proposition that "[f]uture compliance may be more definitely assured if one
is compelled to restore one's illegal gains. '333 Second, he rejected the
majority's application of the canons of statutory construction noscitur a
sociis and ejusdem generis to exclude disgorgement from the remedies
enumerated in § 1964(a). 334 In light of the "expansive" language used in §
1964(a)-"by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to"-
Judge Tatel saw no reason to use these two canons of statutory construction
"to limit the types of equitable relief available to district courts given
Congress's instruction that RICO 'shall be liberally construed to effectuate
its remedial purposes."' 335  Finally, the dissent disagreed with the
majority's argument that permitting disgorgement under § 1964(a) would
permit duplicative recovery, in conjunction with the criminal forfeiture
provisions of RICO: "[T]he Supreme Court has observed that 'Congress
has provided civil remedies for use when the circumstances so warrant. It
is untenable to argue that their existence limits the scope of the criminal
provisions.' ... The converse should hold as well. '336
Although Judge Tatel believed disgorgement could be a permissible
remedy under RICO, he believed its use should be rare337 and he flatly
rejected the suggestion of the Fifth Circuit in Richard338 that disgorgement
could be imposed purely as a general deterrent. 339 Disgorgement would
only be permissible in a case where a court first finds that a defendant is
likely to commit RICO violations in the future.340 But Judge Tatel believed
that, "[i]n equity, as nowhere else, courts [should] eschew rigid absolutes"
330. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1222 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
331. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
332. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1198.
333. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 400 (1946); see also United States v.
Or. State Med. Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952) (holding that the sole purpose of injunctive
relief is to "forestall future violations").
334. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1200.
335. Id. at 1224 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1961
(2000))).
336. Id. (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981)).
337. Id. at 1226.
338. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
339. See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1225 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing that, "[b]ecause
any remedy imposed for a solely exemplary purpose (i.e., to dissuade others from
committing RICO violations) would amount to punishment, it goes beyond what Congress
intended as well as pushes the boundaries of what equity permits" (citation omitted)).
340. Id. at 1224-25.
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recognizing that "precisely what remedy or combination of remedies...
will serve to prevent and restrain defendants from committing RICO
violations is an issue of fact, not statutory interpretation."'341
As discussed in this part, the various positions taken on the availability of
disgorgement under RICO-the Second and Fifth Circuits' qualified
acceptance in Carson and Richard, respectively, the D.C. District Court's
categorical acceptance in Philip Morris, and the D.C. Circuit's categorical
rejection in Philip Morris-stem from disagreement as to the extent of the
equitable jurisdiction granted to district courts by § 1964(a). Carson and
Richard held that § 1964(a) circumscribes a district court's equitable
jurisdiction to those remedies that could "prevent and restrain" future RICO
violations. But Carson and Richard also held that disgorgement could,
under certain circumstances, "prevent and restrain" future RICO violations,
and therefore be consistent with the statutory grant of authority. The D.C.
District Court in Philip Morris disagreed that § 1964(a) imposes any such
restriction, arguing that the statute grants district courts the full range of
equitable authority, including the authority to impose disgorgement. The
D.C. Circuit in Philip Morris reversed, holding, like Carson and Richard,
that § 1964(a) does indeed circumscribe a district court's equitable
authority, but the D.C. Circuit interpreted the statute much more narrowly
than Carson and Richard, holding that disgorgement could never be
permissible under § 1964(a).
III. DISGORGEMENT IS A PERMISSIBLE REMEDY UNDER § 1964(A)
This Comment argues that § 1964(a) does indeed grant district courts the
full range of their equitable authority-authority which includes the power
to disgorge RICO defendants of ill-gotten gains. In so arguing, this
Comment disagrees with the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Philip Morris and
also with the qualified acceptance of disgorgement under § 1964(a)
advocated by the Second Circuit in Carson and adopted by the Fifth Circuit
in Richard. This Comment argues that disgorgement is one of the equitable
remedies available to a district court exercising its inherent equitable
authority, as evidenced by § 1964(a)'s text as well as RICO's legislative
purpose. Alternatively, even if § 1964(a) does not represent a full grant of
equitable authority, disgorgement, properly understood as a deterrent to
future RICO violations, is wholly consistent with the statutory charge to
"prevent and restrain" future RICO violations.
A. Section 1964(a) Provides District Courts a General Grant of Equitable
Jurisdiction
As the Supreme Court held in Porter-a case never overruled and cited
by the Supreme Court as recently as 2001 34 2-absent a "clear and valid
341. Id. at 1226 (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 777 n. 39 (1976))(first and second alternations in original).
342. See supra note 127.
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legislative command" or a "necessary and inescapable inference," "all the
inherent equitable powers of the District Court are available for the proper
and complete exercise of that jurisdiction."343  Section 1964(a) grants
district courts jurisdiction to "prevent and restrain violations of [RICO] by
issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to" orders of
divestment, injunction or dissolution. 344 Contrary to the D.C. Circuit's
opinion in Philip Morris, the Second Circuit's in Carson, and the Fifth
Circuit's in Richard-all of which construed the "prevent and restrain"
language to circumscribe district courts' equitable authority-§ 1964(a)
contains neither a "clear and valid legislative command" nor a "necessary
and inescapable inference" restricting a district court's "inherent equitable
powers."
At the outset, it is critical to understand Congress's broad aims and
purpose in enacting RICO. 345 When Congress enacted RICO in 1970, it
directed in no uncertain terms that RICO "shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes" 346 and that district courts should have the
authority under RICO to "craft equitable relief broad enough to do all that is
necessary." 347 While three remedies were enumerated in the statute, "'the
list is not exhaustive."' 348 In light of these congressional admonitions, the
Supreme Court has held that "RICO is to be read broadly. This is the
lesson... of Congress'[s] self-consciously expansive language and overall
approach ... .,,349 A broad reading is particularly appropriate in § 1964,
"where RICO's remedial purposes are most evident. '350 But the Supreme
Court has also held that Congress's express admonition to construe RICO
liberally "is not an invitation to apply RICO to new purposes that Congress
never intended."'35'
There simply is no evidence, however, that Congress intended to
withhold or limit a district court's equitable jurisdiction in § 1964(a). On
the contrary, the evidence suggests a "clear and valid legislative command"
that Congress intended to grant district courts full equitable jurisdiction, not
restrict it.352 The D.C. Circuit in Philip Morris relied on the general
comprehensiveness of the RICO statute to support its conclusion that
Congress intended to circumscribe a district court's equitable jurisdiction
under § 1964(a)-that is, because Congress did not explicitly grant district
courts full equitable jurisdiction, Congress must have intended to withhold
343. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).
344. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2000).
345. See supra notes 23-30, 52-54 and accompanying text.
346. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 947
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
347. See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 72, 77 (D.D.C. 2004)
(citing S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 160 (1969)).
348. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 160).
349. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985).
350. Id. at 491 n.10.
351. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183 (1993).
352. See supra notes 345-50 and accompanying text.
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it.353 This conclusion seeks a level of specificity from Congress that is
unrealistic, impractical, and unworkable. 354 More importantly, however,
the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of § 1964(a) simply reads language out of
the statute, in contravention of the familiar proposition that "[c]ourts should
disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous. '355
Section 1964(a) grants district courts jurisdiction to issue "appropriate
orders, including but not limited to" those enumerated therein. The words
"appropriate orders," properly analogized to the words "appropriate
remedies," have been interpreted to "connote[] the remedial discretion
which is the hallmark of equity. '356 The word "including" in the statute
"makes clear that [appropriate orders] are not limited to the examples that
follow that word." 357 Unless the words "including but not limited to" are
superfluous, then additional remedies beyond those enumerated must be
permissible under § 1964(a). Because these additional remedies were not
enumerated, it certainly seems reasonable to conclude that Congress
intended district courts to retain their inherent 358 equitable authority.
Indeed, coupled with Congress's admonition that RICO "shall be liberally
construed," this conclusion seems the most probable. At the very least,
however, the presence of this language rebuts the notion that § 1964(a)
contains a "clear and valid legislative command" or a "necessary and
inescapable inference" that Congress intended to circumscribe district
courts' inherent equitable jurisdiction.
The D.C. Circuit in Philip Morris, the Second Circuit in Carson, and the
Fifth Circuit in Richard all held, however, that the "prevent and restrain"
language in § 1964(a) represented an express limitation on district courts'
equitable jurisdiction. There is reason to doubt this argument. In Mitchell,
the Supreme Court interpreted a statute authorizing district courts "to
restrain violations" of the FLSA as having conferred inherent equitable
jurisdiction on the district courts. 359 While the Supreme Court in Meghrig
construed almost identical language in the RCRA as imposing a limit on
district courts' equitable jurisdiction, a number of lower courts have
construed similar language as conferring full equitable jurisdiction. 360
Moreover, bearing in mind the Supreme Court's admonition in Porter that,
where the public interest is implicated-as it undoubtedly is in the
353. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
354. See Flint, supra note 294, at 638-40.
355. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 233 (2003) (quoting Conn.
Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992)).
356. West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 225-26 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (interpreting
the words "appropriate remedies" under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (2000)).
357. Id. at 218 (interpreting the word "including" in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e).
358. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1163 (3d ed. 1986) (defining
"inherent" as "structural or involved in the constitution or essential character of something").
359. See supra Part I.B.3.
360. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
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Government's case against the tobacco companies 36 1-district courts'
"equitable powers assume an even broader and more flexible character," 362
this argument circumscribing jurisdiction based on the "prevent and
restrain" language simply cannot carry the day. 363
B. Disgorgement Is Consistent with the Text of§ 1964(a)
Even if § 1964(a) is not a general grant of equitable authority,
disgorgement would be a permissible remedy thereunder. By the plain
language of § 1964(a), the only "appropriate orders" a district court is
authorized to issue are those that "prevent and restrain" future RICO
violations. Divestment, injunction, and dissolution are but three examples
of such "appropriate orders." Disgorgement, properly understood as a
deterrent to committing future RICO violations, 364 can indeed "prevent and
restrain" consistent with § 1964(a).
As the D.C. Circuit conceded in Philip Morris, disgorging a RICO
defendant of ill-gotten gains would be a means of preventing and
restraining future RICO violations, insofar as it would "make[] RICO
violations unprofitable." 365 However, the D.C. Circuit agreed with the
Second Circuit in Carson-and, therefore, the Fifth Circuit in Richard-
that if "prevent and restrain" were intended to include disgorgement, then §
1964(a) would read "prevent, restrain and discourage." 366 The D.C. Circuit
reached this conclusion because it held that only remedies similarly
forward-looking as those enumerated in the statute could be inferred by the
language "including, but not limited to." 367  The D.C. Circuit excluded
disgorgement because it was a "quintessentially backward-looking
remedy."368
This erroneous conclusion stems from a misunderstanding of the nature
of the disgorgement at issue. While it is true that disgorgement is
"measured by the amount of prior unlawful gains" 369 it is not true that
361. See supra Part II.C. 1 (describing the nature of the Government's lawsuit).
362. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946); accord Mitchell v. Robert
DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) (holding that "'there is inherent in the
Courts of Equity a jurisdiction to... give effect to the policy of the legislature' (quoting
Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195, 200 (1839))); United States v. Philip Morris USA,
Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., dissenting); United States v. Alisal
Water Corp. 427 F.3d 597, 608 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Porter for the proposition that a
district court's equitable powers are even broader in a case involving the public as opposed
to private interests).
363. Cf Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 497, 503 (1836) ("The great principles of
equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful
construction.").
364. See supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
365. See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1200.
366. United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation
omitted).
367. See supra notes 297-300 and accompanying text.
368. See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1198.
369. Id.
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disgorgement, under § 1964(a), "is awarded without respect to whether the
defendant will act unlawfully in the future. ' 370  Disgorgement is an
equitable remedy. 371 "Whether equitable relief is appropriate [under §
1964(a)] depends... on whether a preponderance of the evidence shows a
likelihood that the defendants will commit wrongful acts in the future, a
likelihood which is frequently established by inferences drawn from past
conduct." 372 The district court in Philip Morris made it abundantly clear
that the threshold inquiry in determining the availability of disgorgement
under § 1964(a) would be the likelihood of the defendant committing RICO
violations in the future. 373 The dissenting opinion on the D.C. Circuit
agreed. 374  The Supreme Court, moreover, has held that "[f]uture
compliance may be more definitely assured if one is compelled to restore
one's illegal gains." 375
Relying on Meghrig, in which the Supreme Court unanimously held that
a statute granting district courts jurisdiction to "restrain" improper disposal
of hazardous waste could not be construed to permit compensation for past
cleanup costs, the D.C. Circuit held that "[i]f 'restrain' is only aimed at
future actions, 'prevent' is even more so."13 76  Again, this argument
misunderstands the nature of the remedy contemplated under the RICO
statute. In Meghrig-a case which one court of appeals has characterized
as an outlier 377-there was no question that the hazardous waste at issue no
longer presented "an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or
the environment" precisely because the waste had already been cleaned
up. 3 7 8 The form of disgorgement sought by the Government, however, is
only available upon a finding of a "reasonable likelihood of future RICO
violations." 379
The fact that disgorgement would only be available under § 1964(a) upon
a finding that the defendant is likely to commit future RICO violations
addresses a number of the concerns raised regarding the use of
disgorgement under RICO. First, in his concurring opinion in Philip
Morris, Judge Williams argued against disgorgement by pointing out that
any deterrent effect of disgorgement would be "incremental. '380 It is not
clear how this is at all relevant, as § 1964(a) does not limit a district court's
authority to impose only those remedies that substantially prevent and
restrain future violations.
370. Id.
371. See supra note 92.
372. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974).
373. See supra notes 234-44, 252-55 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 329-31 and accompanying text.
375. Porter v. Warning Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 400 (1946).
376. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
377. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
378. See Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1996).
379. See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 72, 75 (D.D.C. 2004).
380. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
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Second, in Richard, the Fifth Circuit implied that disgorgement could be
imposed on the basis of a general deterrence theory381-that is, that
disgorgement would be an appropriate remedy for a given RICO defendant
because it would deter similar persons from committing RICO violations. 382
Such an approach would amount to punitive damages, a remedy outside the
scope of the equitable relief authorized by § 1964(a). 383 Concerns over this
approach appear to underlie the Second Circuit's decision limiting
disgorgement in Carson.384 What is advocated here is disgorgement as a
specific deterrent, 385 meant to disgorge ill-gotten gains from a specific
RICO defendant to prevent and restrain that defendant from committing any
further RICO violations.
Finally, the limitation Carson placed upon disgorgement-holding it
permissible only in instances where "there is a finding that the gains are
being used to fund or promote the illegal conduct, or constitute capital
available for that purpose" 386-is, if read literally, patently absurd.387
Money, of course, is fungible. Permitting a RICO defendant to avoid
having to disgorge his ill-gotten gains merely because he had already spent
those specific gains would be a highly disconcerting elevation of form over
substance. More broadly, however, the Carson limitation on disgorgement
is unnecessary because it rests on the assumption that disgorgement is not a
forward-looking remedy and therefore cannot be considered to "prevent and
restrain" future RICO violations. As argued above, disgorgement, properly
understood as a specific deterrent, and imposed upon a finding that the
defendant is likely to commit future RICO violations, can indeed "prevent
and restrain" future RICO violations. In any event, the disgorgement
advocated here would be a requirement to "return a sum equal to the
amount wrongfully obtained, rather than a requirement to replevy a specific
asset."388
381. General deterrence is "designed to prevent future crimes by members of the public at
large." Frase, supra note 210, at 71.
382. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 337-39 and accompanying text.
384. United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1995).
385. Black's Law Dictionary defines special (specific) deterrence as follows: "A goal of
a specific conviction and sentence to dissuade the offender from committing crimes in the
future." Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 210, at 460; see also Frase, supra note 210, at
70 ("Specific deterrence (also known as special or individual deterrence) seeks to discourage
the defendant from committing further crimes by instilling fear of receiving the same or a
more severe penalty in the future.").
386. Carson, 52 F.3d at 1182.
387. Judge Williams, in his concurring opinion in Philip Morris, seems to read this
literally in asking how a court would determine which ill-gotten gains are being used to
violate RICO and which are being used for lawful purposes. See supra notes 305-11 and
accompanying text.
388. SEC v. Banner Fund Int'l, 211 F.3d 602, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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CONCLUSION
In Philip Morris, the D.C. Circuit erred in limiting, as a matter of law, the
relief sought by the Government in its innovative and groundbreaking
case389 against the tobacco industry. It erred first by reading-in accord
with the Second Circuit in Carson and the Fifth Circuit in Richard-a
limitation into § 1964(a) that simply is not there, and second by construing
disgorgement as an inherently backward-looking remedy inconsistent with
§ 1964(a)'s command to "prevent and restrain" future RICO violations. In
fact, as the district court in Philip Morris and the dissent in the D.C. Circuit
correctly found, § 1964(a) contains neither a "clear and valid legislative
command" nor a "necessary and inescapable inference" that would
circumscribe a district court's equitable jurisdiction. Moreover, even if §
1964(a) does circumscribe a district court's equitable authority,
disgorgement, imposed upon a finding of a likelihood of future RICO
violations, would be consistent with the statutory command to "prevent and
restrain." In holding otherwise, the Second Circuit in Carson, the Fifth
Circuit in Richard, and the D.C. Circuit in Philip Morris have ignored the
plain language of § 1964(a), Congress's express intent in enacting RICO
and the Supreme Court's command to "do complete rather than truncated
justice." 390
389. See supra note 7.
390. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).
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